Comeback of Realism: the Case of China - EU confrontation over the Belt and Road Initiative by Hasanov, Aykhan
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN 
  
KHAZAR UNIVERSITY 
 
SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES, EDUCATION AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
Major:  HISTORY AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
                      
 
MASTER THESIS 
Title: Comeback of Realism: the Case of China - EU confrontation over the 
Belt and Road Initiative 
 
 
 
 
 Master Student:               Aykhan Hasanov 
 
 Supervisor:                  PhD Vasif Huseynov  
                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baku-2019  
2 
 
CONTENTS 
 
ABBREVATIONS .................................................................................................. 3 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................... 4 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................ 5 
INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................... 6 
I CHAPTER. Theoretical Framework ....................................................................... 12 
1.1. The Realist IR School of Thought ........................................................................ 12 
1.2. The OBOR Initiative through a realist perspective ................................................ 14 
II CHAPTER.  Key features of the Belt and Road ...................................................... 18 
2.1 Main stages in the establishment and development of the Belt and Road Initiative .... 18 
2.2. Strategic motives for the initiation of the OBOR Initiative ..................................... 27 
2.3. The main challenges in the realization of the OBOR ............................................. 40 
III CHAPTER. China-EU relations in the framework of the OBOR ........................... 44 
3.1. Dynamics of political, economic and trade relations between the EU and China until 
2013 ...................................................................................................................... 44 
3.2. Interaction of the PRC and EU institutions within the OBOR ................................. 50 
3.3. “16 + 1” format as a platform for bilateral cooperation between the PRC and the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe ................................................................... 57 
3.4. Bilateral cooperation between the PRC and the countries of Western and Southern 
Europe within the OBOR.......................................................................................... 68 
3.4.1. Germany .................................................................................................... 71 
3.4.2. France ....................................................................................................... 74 
3.4.3. Britain ....................................................................................................... 76 
3.4.4. Italy .......................................................................................................... 77 
3.4.5. Portugal .................................................................................................... 79 
3.4.6. Spain ......................................................................................................... 80 
3.4.7. Netherlands ................................................................................................ 81 
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 83 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................... 87 
 
 
3 
 
ABBREVATIONS 
OBOR – One Belt One Road initiative 
EU - European Union 
PRC - People’s Republic of China 
EEU - Eurasian Economic Union  
TEN-T -Trans-European transport network  
ETNC - European Think-tank Network on China  
CEEC - Central and Eastern European Countries   
AIIB - Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank  
SRF - Silk Road Fund  
KKH - Karakoram Highway   
IMF - International Monetary Fund 
ADB - Asian Development Bank  
CNPC - China National Petroleum Corporation 
XUAR - Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
BOMCA - Border Management Programme in Central Asia  
BOMNAF - Border Management Northern Afghanistan  
CADAP - Central Asia Drug Action Programme  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I thank all who in one way or another contributed in the completion of this 
thesis. First, I give thanks to God for protection and ability to do work. I would 
like to thank the Khazar University for allowing me to complete my study here. 
I would also like to convey my appreciation to the School of Humanities, 
Education and Social Sciences, in particular to Dr. Elza Samadova, Dean of the 
School, and the Department of Political Science and Philosophy, in particular to 
Dr. Elmar Mustafayev, Head of the Department. 
I take this opportunity to express gratitude to all the Professors and instructors at 
the Department of Political Science and Philosophy, and other workers of the 
department. 
I place on record, my sincere thanks to Professor Dr. Vasif Huseynov for the 
continues encouragement.  His challenges led to the completion of this work, 
which came into being under his guidance. He continuously and persuasively 
expressed a spirit of adventure in studies and scholarship and excitement in 
teaching. This thesis would not have been possible without his guidance and 
persistent assistance. 
Finally, I am grateful to my family for encouragement, support, and care. I am 
also grateful to my workmates and especially Nijat Mammadli who supported 
and provided me with the opportunity for writing this work. Without them, this 
accomplishment would not have been possible. 
Thanks for all your encouragement! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
ABSTRACT 
China is undergoing a period of economic transition after a long period of 
double digit growth. In light of this economic slowdown, the fifth generation of 
leadership has promoted new policy initiatives aimed at increasing both 
economic growth and political stability. One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative 
is a historical initiative which connects the people over the world. It facilitates 
to connect people through road ways, air ways and water ways, coordinating 
policies of various governments, financial integration through cross border 
business, productivity and regional energy security. The OBOR was welcomed 
by the European Union (EU) when it was announced in 2013 because European 
governments saw opportunities for collaboration with China on building 
infrastructure across Eurasia. Europeans expected the links to increase trade in 
both directions. They also hoped that the large funding resources that China 
promised to allocate to BRI projects could complement their own investments in 
infrastructure. However, later European attitudes towards the Chinese initiative 
became more skeptical when political and economic implications emerged. 
The research focuses on the OBOR initiative, analyzes risks and challenges 
associated to its implementation, trying to understand China’s motivations 
behind the realization of this ambitious project through the realist IR 
perspective. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The relevance of the topic. The Belt and Road initiative (hereinafter referred to 
as the Belt and Road, OBOR or BRI) is a large-scale geo-economic project, 
which is an essential part of China’s modern foreign policy. The core of the 
project is land, sea trade and transport communication networks geographically 
covering the countries of the Eurasian continent as well as Africa. Successful 
implementation of the project will allow China not only to accelerate the pace of 
economic growth and solve internal problems associated with the situation in 
country’s western provinces, but also to fill the vacuum of leadership on the 
world stage, which was partially caused by the US president Donald Trump’s 
policy and the focus of Europe on its internal problems. Even if in his four-year 
presidential term Donald Trump will be able to regain US geopolitical world 
leadership and Europe’s internal problems will be resolved (although at the 
moment this seems unlikely), China will not miss the opportunity to take 
advantage of this situation and strengthen its position on the world stage. 
The European direction is a key link in this project: most of the OBOR transit 
routes, regardless of the length and type of transport, lead to the countries of 
Europe and the European Union (EU). Therefore, it is undoubted that China is 
interested in strengthening and expanding partnership in this area. Part of the 
BRI railway routes leading to European countries passes through the territory 
Russia and the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which have 
embarked on a pairing of their own infrastructure projects with the OBOR since 
2015. It should also be noted that the relevance of the topic is also due to the 
fact that there is a lack of national scientific research on this aspect of EU-China 
relations. In this connection, from the perspective of modern scientific 
knowledge, the study allows to determine the reasons for its appearance, to trace 
the development, and also to identify the impact on the dynamics of relations 
between the European Union and China in the context of international relations 
on the Eurasian continent in particular and on the world stage as a whole. 
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The purpose of the thesis is to identify specifics and problems of 
interaction/confrontation between the EU and China through the BRI. 
The tasks of the thesis. The purpose of the thesis involves the implementation of 
the following tasks: 
- to consider the history of the development of the OBOR from its 
announcement to the present; 
- to highlight main strategic motives for the establishment of the OBOR; 
- to identify main problems of the implementation of the project; 
- to study the dynamics of political and trade-economic relations between 
China and the EU in the period before and after the announcement of the 
project; 
- to identify main formats of cooperation between China and Europe on the 
implementation of the project, their features and problems. 
 
The object of the study is the EU-China relations.  
The subject is the interaction/confrontation between the EU and China within 
the framework of the "One belt, One Road". 
The hypothesis of the thesis is that China sees the world and pursues policy 
within the framework of the OBOR through realist lenses. 
The research limitation. The research is limited to the extent that the OBOR is a 
long-lasting project that will be fully realized by 2050.  
The scientific novelty. On the basis of generalization and study of extensive 
statistical and scientific-historical material, a comprehensive analysis of all 
levels of interaction/confrontation between Europe and China within the 
implementation of the BRI is presented. 
Analysis of the literature. The research topic necessitated the consideration of a 
wide range of sources. In the process of working on the dissertation, the author 
used published sources of various types in Russian, Chinese and English. 
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First of all, these are the regulatory acts of the EU and China. They can be 
divided into two subgroups. The first includes directives, regulations of the 
European Commission and resolutions of the European Parliament on the 
development of infrastructure and the EU economy, as well as on the problems 
of interfacing Trans-European transport network (TEN-T) and OBOR. On the 
Chinese side, this subgroup includes various decrees and legislative acts of the 
People's Republic of China’s (PRC) government in the implementation of the 
BRI. The second subgroup includes agreements between EU institutions and the 
PRC on cooperation in the framework of the OBOR, as well as multilateral and 
bilateral agreements between China and European countries in the 
implementation of economic and infrastructure projects. 
The second group of sources consisted of documents of a political nature. These 
include multilateral declarations concluded following the results of the EU-PRC 
and “16 + 1” summits, as well as memoranda of understanding on the 
implementation of the project between China and individual European 
countries. 
The third group included statements by officials. Fragments were used from 
interviews and speeches by Chinese President Xi Jingping and Foreign Minister 
Wang Yi, statements by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, 
budget commissar Gunter Ettinger, etc. 
The fourth group includes journalistic materials published in a number of 
periodicals. Among foreign publications can be distinguished "People's Daily", 
"China Daily", "EKD", "Xinhua", "South China Morning Post", "World 
Politics", "Foreign Affairs". An analysis of these sources made it possible to 
determine business and government representatives’ positions in China and the 
EU regarding the BRI. 
The fifth group of sources included statistics related to economy, trade and 
infrastructure. Data from Eurostat and the Ministry of Statistics of the PRC were 
used to analyze the dynamics of trade cooperation between the EU and China. 
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Data on specific infrastructure and investment projects, their cost and terms of 
implementation were obtained from the websites of the European Commission, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, the Asian Bank for Infrastructure 
Investments, and the official website of the project. 
Among European authors, the topic of EU-China cooperation/confrontation in 
the framework of the BRI has been studied in more detail. However, there is no 
unanimous opinion regarding the Chinese project, which causes extensive 
discussions in the European expert community about the goals, specifics and 
problems of implementing the project in Europe. 
One of the major centers for studying the EU-China relations is the European 
Think-tank Network on China (ETNC), established on the basis of the French 
Institute of International Relations in 2014. In 2016 and 2017 the center 
prepared two extensive reports on the interaction of the European countries and 
China in the framework of the OBOR. The 2016 report provides an overview of 
ongoing projects in Europe, as well as recommendations for the EU on further 
cooperation with China. 2017 report provides an overview of Chinese 
investment in various sectors of the economy of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Another think tank, The Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 
published a report in 2017 entitled “China’s Belt and Road: a Game Changer?” 
The report provides a comprehensive overview of the Chinese initiative, as well 
as recommendations for the EU on a strategy for engaging with China. The 
works by Richard Ghiasy and Zhou Chiayi, researchers at the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, also devoted to the topic of economic 
and investment cooperation between China and the EU. 
The articles by experts of the China-CEE Institute located in Budapest devoted 
to the topic of interaction between the Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEEC) and China in the framework of the OBOR. In 2018, the center 
published a collection of articles entitled “16 + 1 Cooperation and China-EU”, 
dedicated to aspects of cooperation between China and the countries of the 
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region. In this collection, it is worth highlighting the articles by Xavier Richet 
and Andreea Budenay, who discuss the main problems of interaction in the “16 
+ 1” format and criticize China’s approach to the cooperation. 
In general, European authors are skeptical of the Chinese initiative, noting that 
the win-win strategy announced by China will actually benefit only China. This 
point of view is reflected in the works of Alice Ekman and Camille Brugier, 
experts of the French Institute of International Relations, who express the 
opinion that the European countries lack the political will to act with China as 
equal partners. A different position is taken by Esteban Michael and Miguel 
Otero-Iglesias, the Spanish experts of the Elcano Royal Institute. In the joint 
article, they note that Europe should not miss the opportunities offered by the 
Chinese project, especially in the field of infrastructure development. 
Chinese authors are more supportive of the BRI and its impact on the dynamics 
of relations with the EU. Among the major centers it is worth highlighting 
Peking University and the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. Thus, 
Chinese experts Zhao Minghao and Zhang Hongzhou argue that the OBOR is 
an open and transparent project that aims at multilateral and comprehensive 
development. According to the authors, the skepticism of Western countries is 
primarily due to their unwillingness to discard the Cold War logic and the 
concept of a zero-sum game. However, the authors also note that China needs to 
work on the project’s image in order to overcome the negative perception 
generated by Western media. 
A collection of articles by experts from the S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies (RSIS) of Singapore is devoted to security issues in the 
implementation of the Chinese project. The authors indicate the main motives 
for the appearance of the BRI. In particular, the problem of Uyghur separatism, 
as well as the potential blockade of the Strait of Malacca by unfriendly states 
like the US and its allies is noted. 
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Nevertheless, it is worth considering that from the perspective of the Chinese 
government, social sciences are means of contributing to the protection of the 
country's political, economic and social interests. Most of the works are aimed 
at legitimizing the existing interests of China, and in publications it is almost 
impossible to find a point of view that goes beyond the framework of official 
politics and rhetoric. 
The structure of the thesis is determined by the purpose and objectives of the 
study. The work consists of an introduction, three chapters (included total nine 
sub-chapters) conclusion and bibliography. 
Research methodology. The realist IR perspective establishes the theoretical 
background for analyzing China’s motivations behind the creation of the OBOR 
initiative. The paper uses qualitative and quantitative research to understand the 
main motivations of the project. In view of the wide-ranging economic and 
political implications of the OBOR, the level of analysis is national, regional, 
and global.  
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I CHAPTER. Theoretical Framework  
 
1.1. The Realist IR School of Thought  
Realism is based on the perception that the countries strive for power in an 
anarchical state of affairs. As Stephan M. Waltz considers realism depicts 
international affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states and is 
generally pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating conflict and war” 
(Stephen M. Walt, 1998). Realism can be divided into two parts according to 
states’ different behavior in the anarchical world: defensive realism and 
offensive realism. On one hand, defensive realists like Kenneth Waltz believe 
that the world order is anarchical in nature, but claim the fact that states tend to 
preserve their position in the international system instead of maximizing their 
power. Therefore, states aim to secure themselves rather than seek supremacy. 
On the other hand, offensive realists like John Mearsheimer, debate that state 
seeks to maximize power and security under the assumption that all 
international affairs are a zero-sum game (J. Mearsheimer, 2001). As a result, 
states continuously compete each other for regional hegemony, excluding the 
possibility of having “peer competitors” (J. Mearsheimer, 2005).  
Realists start with the assumption that the state is the basic actor that we have to 
take into account in order to analyze a given situation: of course there are other 
players that need to be taken into consideration (the IMF, the UN or the 
Commission), but the nation-state is the one that holds extensive control on the 
political elite and the most influential pressure groups, most importantly on the 
economic level (Bustelo, 2003).  
Whenever we have to deal with states, we have to consider them as being in a 
relationship that is dominated by anarchy: no state is formally superior to 
another and each one of them will try to determine its own national policy 
according to the constraints that others impose on them. In the end, states are 
concerned with survival (which entails political and territorial integrity) and this 
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is why they take into account both absolute and relative gains: sometimes 
gaining is not enough, it must be also ensured that the opponents remain in a 
situation of subordination (Krasner, 2002). This is also why, on the economic 
level, it is way easier (or at least possible) to act in accordance with a state that 
does not represent a threat in any way: a big and a small actor have higher 
chances of cooperating, while whenever two giants are fighting there is always 
the need of not falling prey of the other. It can be also said that influence over 
world economic affairs is maintained through a strong security concern: this 
means that, in order to become a great economic power, a state must either be 
able to protect itself or to live under the protection of a third state (Gilpin, 
2001). 
In such a situation, the term state-centric is of high relevance: it also means that 
each state will try to pursue a policy that fosters the well-being of its citizens 
according to the possibility that the international arena and the markets provide 
to it (Gilpin, 2001): this can be seen as a neo-mercantilist way of dealing with 
the economic field which leads to the assumption that the only economic 
progress that matters is the one achieved at the national level (or with 
ramification on the national level) and that politics will necessarily shape every 
relevant aspect of the economic field (Simon-Belli, 2002). It is safe to say that 
from a realist point of view trade can be seen as an option among others in order 
to gain power vis-à-vis the remaining players: a state might either limit the 
availability of products or technology available for third parties or it can 
threaten the same ones by menacing to change the rules of the trading game. 
Both threats are credible only if they are asymmetrical, meaning that the state 
pursuing such policies will lose way less in comparison to the one that we 
consider the target and strong contrasts will rise between powers of the same 
magnitude (Krasner, 2002). In the end, states will try to maximize their relative 
gains by putting the accent on getting the upper hand in strategic sectors that 
can be easily converted into real power while at the same time being able to 
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portrait that in the domestic field as an advantage for society at large (Cafruny, 
Magnus Ryner 2009).  
 
Testable outcomes:  
- A Realist perspective prescribes that any cooperative endeavor will result 
in a mutual success if and only if both actors manage to gain from such 
relationship in the same proportion without jeopardizing their relative 
power.  
- If no actor is able to dominate the other, there will be a minimal level of 
integration useful only to keep every alternative available, but nothing 
more 
 
1.2. The OBOR Initiative through a realist perspective 
The realist perspective bases its evidences on China’s national interest in 
securing natural resources, China’s attempt to increase its military capabilities, 
and China’s desire to challenge the international order. Despite China’s peaceful 
rise doctrine in the international community, realist scholars hold that the 
OBOR initiative represents China’s attempt to bring South Asian and European 
countries under its sphere of influence, exclusively advancing a Sino-centric 
agenda. Indeed, realist scholars believe that there are significant evidences that 
support the view of China orchestrating a grand strategy. According to the 
realist view, the OBOR initiative and its infrastructure developments improve 
only China’s national interest. Second, the OBOR project allows China to bring 
countries under its sphere of influence, establishing regional hegemony. Third, 
the OBOR through its new institutions - Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) and Silk Road Fund (SRF) - seek to challenge the Bretton Woods 
international system status quo. 
Starting from the first assumption, realists emphasize that OBOR enhanced 
investments in South Asia and Europe mirror China’s increasing need for 
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natural resources. As data show, China’s demand for imported oil, natural gas, 
and coal is expected to rise by 60% by 2010 and 2035. In response to this need, 
China is working on securing supply lines connecting China to the Middle East 
and Africa. In particular, China is trying through additional economic corridors 
to overcome the Strait of Malacca since whoever controls that strait can exercise 
a stronghold on China’s supply energy lines. Through a realist lens, China’s 
vision of diversifying supply lines aims to advance exclusively Chinese national 
interest rather than promoting local growth in its neighboring countries. 
However, China’s strategic actions in securing supply lines does not fully 
support the realist position unless there are clear evidences that Chinese-led 
infrastructures exploit countries’ economies taking part in the OBOR project. 
The Karakoram Highway (KKH) in Pakistan and maritime constructions in Sri 
Lanka entail some of these evidences, demonstrating that Chinese-led 
infrastructures could also produce unintended effects both on a regional and 
national level. In Pakistan, for instance, the KKH has not produced the expected 
outcomes in the Gilgit-Baltisan region, failing in promoting significant growth 
in the local economy. According to a report of the Institute of Defense Studies 
and Analyses in New Delhi, “the per capita per annum income of Gilgit-
Baltisan is only one fourth of Pakistan’s national average and more than 1.3 
million of inhabitants still live below the poverty line”. Similarly on the national 
level, statistics show that “when Sino-Pakistani trade reached 7$ billion mark in 
2009, the share of trade via KKH was miniscule 4%.” In Sri Lanka, the scenario 
is almost the same. Chinese-led infrastructures have produced little economic 
benefits when compared to the high debt Sri Lanka owes to China. As these 
infrastructures have produced small growth, the newly elected Sri Lanka 
President, M. Sirisena has officially relinquished the idea of joining the OBOR 
project, driving the country towards a closer relationship with India and the 
United States. Aside from considering the OBOR as tool to promote only 
Chinese national interest, realist scholars also believe that China is trying 
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through its infrastructures developments to expand its sphere of influence in 
South Asia and Europe, dictating economic and political policies. In addition, 
India is concerned that China’s initiatives could interfere in its sphere of 
influences. Indeed, China has succeeded in surpassing India in trade relations 
with Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma, enjoying good economic relations with 
nearly all countries. Through a realist lens, China’s increased influence in South 
Asia and Europe through its infrastructures developments allows China to 
pressure countries that do not conform to OBOR principles. As the Center for 
American progress outlines, the OBOR invested “in countries that have both a 
strong relationship with China and hold popular support for Chinese 
investments”. Furthermore, some realists argue that China is economically 
supporting countries that could challenge India’s sphere of influence in the 
region. According to this realist assumption, Beijing’s strong relationship with 
Islamabad enables Pakistan to contain India’s influence in the region “under a 
Chinese security blanket”. On the basis of this view, realists also highlight 
China’s strategy of prioritizing other areas of national interests, while 
constraining India’s influence through the strategic help of Pakistan. Although 
there are some evidences that see the OBOR as a strategy to enhance China’s 
political influence in the region, it is still difficult to understand if China is 
seeking a strategy aimed at creating political and economic dependencies and 
directly undermining India’s interest in the region.  
Moving to the global level, China’s newly conceived financial institutions, the 
AIIB and the SRF, represent through a realist lens a challenge to the status quo 
of the international system. China’s decision of creating multilateral 
organizations originated from U.S. Congress failed attempt to ratify reforms in 
the voting power system of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In addition, 
the incapability of providing sufficient funds in the region by Japan and U.S. led 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), pushed China to come up with a multilateral 
solution. According to realist scholars, the creation of these new institutions 
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constitutes an attempt to challenge the regional and global order, advancing the 
strategic influence of OBOR-led infrastructures through the allocation of funds. 
Related to this concern is the division of voting shares in the AIIB. While 
China’s voting power in the ADB and IMF is around 5% and 4%, respectively, 
China holds 26.06% in the AIIB. As a result, realist scholars see in the increased 
voting power China’s intention to allocate funds, exclusively on the basis of its 
national interests. In line with this assumption, the United States has not joined 
the AIIB yet, pointing out the lack of transparency and high standards of the 
bank. As President Obama officially stated in a press conference “we don’t want 
to be participating in something and providing cover for an institution that does 
not end up doing the right thing to the people. Because when these countries 
borrow money even from a development bank…they are most of the time on the 
hook for paying that money back”. However, those in favor of promoting the 
multilateral bank argue that these statements are hypocritical since the United 
States had repeatedly blamed China for not carrying any international 
responsibilities. The realist view still considers the OBOR and its financial 
institutions as a mean to rewrite international norms and challenge the US-
shaped Bretton Woods system. 
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II CHAPTER.  Key features of the Belt and Road  
 
2.1 Main stages in the establishment and development of the Belt and Road 
Initiative 
China’s “One Belt, One Road Initiative” or “Silk Road Economic Belt and the 
21st Century Maritime Silk Road” was first presented during President Xi 
Jinping’s official visit to Kazakhstan in the fall of 2013. Speaking at 
Nazarbayev University, Xi Jinping pointed out that “the ancient Silk Road has 
gained new strength and new look over the past 20 years” and proposed “to 
apply the new model of cooperation and joint efforts to form the economic belt 
of the Silk Road on the Eurasian continent”1. In his speech, Xi Jinping 
formulated the main aspects of the initiative. These include: political 
cooperation, construction of a unified infrastructure, strengthening trade 
relations, enhancing currency flows and development of relations between 
nations. However, the Chinese President did not mention specific actions and 
practical steps to implement these aspects of cooperation, limiting himself to 
saying that China is ready to any suggestions from interested countries. 
Nevertheless, many politicians and researchers had already agreed that this 
initiative has a significant geostrategic nature. A month later, during his speech 
at the Indonesian parliament Xi Jinping proposed the establishment of the New 
Silk Road as a continuation of the Continental New Silk Road. These two 
proposals were subsequently expressed together under the title of "The Belt and 
Road Initiative" as a proposition underpinning a China-led global development 
agenda. The Belt and Road Initiative has since been constantly mentioned in the 
speeches of President Xi as a keyword to define the vision of China for “shared 
beliefs and norms of conduct for the whole region” (Xi Jinping, 2014). The 
project involves 71 states that jointly account for over 30% of world GDP, 62% 
 
1 President Xi Jinping’s speech at Nazarbayev University. Available at http://kz.china-
embassy.org/rus/zhgx/zxdt/t1077192.htm (Accessed: 22 June 2019).    
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of population, and 75% of estimated power reserves (Freund, C. and Ruta, M., 
2018). The BRI consists primarily of the Silk Road Economic Belt, which links 
China to Central and South Asia and Europe, and the New Maritime Silk Road, 
which links China to Southeast Asia, the Gulf Countries, North Africa, and 
Europe2. To connect other nations to the Belt and Road Initiative, another six 
economic corridors have been defined. 
There are different views regarding the BRI. On the one hand, a number of 
Western researchers describe the project as a new geopolitical strategy of China 
comparable to the Marshall Plan, which threatens Western hegemony3. Thus, in 
February 2019 Foreign Affairs published an article analyzing the methods and 
tools used by China to achieve its goals. According to the author, in the political 
sphere China acts through a combination of covert actions and means of public 
diplomacy4. China has established hundreds of Confucius Institutes at 
universities around the world in order to form an appropriate discourse and 
foreign-language media to spread the views of the Chinese Communist Party. 
The author further claims that Chinese intelligence agents even recruited 
Chinese citizens studying abroad as informers, whose duties included the 
transmission of information about what Chinese students and professors say 
about their country. China sought to have a more direct influence on politics in 
Australia and New Zealand, secretly donating money to preferred candidates. 
This narrative is similar in many Western media that contributes to the 
formation of a negative image of China and its project in these countries. 
On the other hand, some characterize the initiative as China’s new economic 
strategy aimed at further integrating its domestic market into the global one, as 
well as a new diplomatic strategy for expanding China’s foreign relations with 
 
2 Mapping the Belt and Road initiative: this is where we stand. Available at 
https://www.merics.org/en/bri-tracker/mapping-the-belt-and-road-initiative (Accessed: 22 June 2019).  
3 Ekman, Alice. China in Asia: What is behind the new silk roads? – Paris & Brussels: French Institute 
of International Relations, 2015. – P. 2. 
4 Mastro, Oriana Skylar. Stealth superpower: How China hid Its global ambitions. // Foreign affairs, 
2019. – № 98(1). – P. 32. 
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countries along the Belt and Road5. It is worth noting that the Chinese 
authorities characterize BRI mainly as an economic initiative aimed at mutually 
beneficial cooperation and social and economic benefits that it can bring to 
China and other participating countries According to China, Western countries 
guided by the principles of geopolitics for analysis of economic initiatives, are 
beginning to think in terms of the Cold War, which only hinders cooperation 
between countries and the world development6. It is characteristic that the 
Chinese authorities, as a rule, call the BRI "strategy" at home and "initiative" 
abroad. 
Since the BRI is a multidimensional and complex project, its research through 
only one aspect impedes the understanding of the entire integrity of the 
initiative. Therefore, to understand the logic behind the BRI, it is necessary to 
analyze the internal and global economic context within which the project is 
located.  
First of all, today China no longer has just a domestic economic policy due to 
the growing influence in the global economy. After decades of rapid economic 
growth China has become the world's second largest economy. In 2007, it also 
became the world's largest exporter and second largest importer7. Its import 
market is roughly equal to the import markets of other BRICS countries (Brazil, 
Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa), Japan and Turkey 
combined. The Chinese economy has become a leader in other areas. In 2016 
investments in China were four times higher than the level of investments in 
Japan, as well as investments in the United States and the European Union by 
 
5 Hongzhou, Zhang. Building the Silk Road Economic Belt: Problems and Priorities in Central Asia // 
Singapore: RSIS Policy Report, 2015. – P. 3. 
6 Си Цзиньпин: менталитет "холодной войны" и "игры с нулевой суммой" является устаревшим, 
Russian.news.cn, 2019, online, Internet, 9 Jul. 2019. Available: http://russian.news.cn/2018-
04/10/c_137100248.htm.  
7 National Bureau of Statistics of China >> Annual Data, Stats.gov.cn, 2019, online, Internet, 9 Jul. 
2019. Available: http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/AnnualData/. 
21 
 
35% and 25% respectively8. China’s share in metals markets is more than 50% 
of global demand. Thus, at present China’s decisions regarding its own 
monetary and fiscal policies have an impact on the rest of the world, from the 
West to the BRICS and Africa. And it is not surprising that any large-scale 
domestic economic project in China can directly or indirectly influence the 
entire global economy, since the ties of other countries with China through trade 
and foreign direct investment have expanded significantly over the past decade. 
Thus, according to The Economist, a potential crisis in China is the 4th largest 
threat to the global economy in 20199. Due to this growing influence, China 
cannot stand aside when forming a new international order. 
Before Xi Jinping came to power, the leaders of China implemented their 
policies in accordance with Deng Xiaoping’s motto: “China needs to hide its 
capabilities, wait for time, achieve results where possible”. However, after the 
change of leadership in 2012 there was a significant shift in the strategic 
thinking of the Chinese authorities from the mentality of the "small country" to 
the mentality of the "big country"10. The new leadership realized that the 
country has no other choice than to cooperate with its main partners on the 
implications of the rapid growth of Chinese influence. Otherwise, China could 
become an object of deterrence on the part of the largest countries. In 
connection with this change, Chinese politicians began to focus equally on 
international as well as domestic markets and to plan domestic reforms in the 
context of global perspectives. For example, in the decision on reforms after the 
 
8 Impact of China on Europe and Central Asia // World bank, 2019, online, Internet, 9 
Jul.2019.Available:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/136351467990956476/pdf/104605-
REVISED-ECA-2016.pdf.  
9 Cause for concern? The top 10 risks to the global economy 2019 // The Economist, 2019, online, 
Internet, 9 Jul. 2019. Available: https://qps.ru/V93ks.  
10 China’s Belt and Road: a game changer? / Edited by Alessia Amighini. – Milan: The Italian Institute 
for International Political Studies, 2017. – P. 20. 
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3rd Plenum of the 18th Party Congress, it was intended to “adapt to the new 
situation of globalization”11. 
Second, after nearly 35 years of high growth China is entering a “normal stage”, 
with a projected growth of around 6.5% per year12. The search for new growth 
drivers and the transformation of the economic system is an urgent task. To 
achieve this goals, at the end of 2013 the Central Committee of the Party made 
an ambitious decision on reforms in order to achieve a more efficient and more 
open market economy. One of the key areas of reform is the further opening of 
the Chinese economy to the world, especially through the development of 
China’s internal and border regions, the development of new transport routes 
and the strengthening of infrastructure links between neighboring countries and 
regions of the country13. This will help attract foreign companies to China and 
expand the presence of Chinese companies abroad. Certain steps for this were 
taken in July 2018, when China halved the list of sectors closed to foreign 
investment - there are 4814. In March 2019, the deputy head of the PRC State 
Committee for Reform and Development Ning Jizhe said that in 2019 China 
would again expand the list of economic sectors open to foreign investment. 
Moreover, the traditional structure of the Chinese economy, which relied on 
large investments in fixed assets and the export of large volumes of cheap 
goods, can no longer ensure the development of the country. Currently, a new 
model of supporting economic development is required by creating a larger 
number of high-tech industries with high added value, which is a difficult and 
lengthy process. About three decades ago, the economies of South Korea, 
 
11 Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues 
Concerning Comprehensively Deepening, China.org.cn, 2019, online, Internet, 9 Jul. 2019. Available: 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm.  
12 Всемирный банк понижает прогнозы экономического роста КНР, Ru.gbtimes.com, 2019, online, 
Internet,9Jul.2019.Available:http://ru.gbtimes.com/novosti/vsemirnyy-bank-ponizhaet-prognozy-
ekonomicheskogo-rosta-knr.  
13 Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues 
Concerning Comprehensively Deepening, China.org.cn, 2019, online, Internet, 9 Jul. 2019. 
Available:http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm  
14 Китай расширит список секторов, открытых для инокапитала, ЭКД, 2019, online, Internet, 9 Jul. 
2019. Available: http://ekd.me/2019/03/kitaj-rasshirit-spisok-sektorov-otkrytyx-dlya-inokapitala.  
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Taiwan, and Hong Kong faced the same problems as domestic labor costs rose 
sharply. They moved most of their labor-intensive manufacturing enterprises to 
eastern coastal areas of China and continued to modernize the domestic 
industrial structure. These steps not only helped South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong overcome a number of economic problems, but also provided 
opportunities for mainland China to achieve industrialization and 
modernization, as well as create many jobs. The BRI will not only help China 
transform its own economic system, but also create economic development 
opportunities for all developing countries along the Belt and Road. 
Third, 10 years after the 2008 financial crisis, the world economy still has a 
number of problems, which led to a number of international events that shook 
the world community: from the refugee crisis in Europe and Brexit, to the 
turbulent American presidential elections and subsequent changes in US policy; 
from the civil war in Syria, religious extremism in Indonesia to economic 
depression in Latin America. Most of these social and political phenomena have 
economic reasons. Therefore, the search for new long-term growth drivers is 
essential for a sustainable recovery of the world economy and ensuring a long-
term peace. However, this will take years of hard work. For example, 
developing countries in Asia have enormous market potential, but their 
economic growth is limited by an underdeveloped infrastructure and a lack of 
funds to catch up15. Despite the intensification of bilateral trade, investment and 
other economic ties with China, for the developed countries of Europe the huge 
potential of relations with China are obvious. This is mainly due to restrictions, 
prohibitions and other institutional barriers16. In this regard, the “Belts and 
Ways” initiative is not aimed only on the creation of trade and infrastructure 
networks, but also on the search for a harmonious and comprehensive 
 
15 Asia’s $26tn infrastructure gap threatens growth, ADB warns | Financial Times, Ft.com, 2019, 
online, Internet, 9 Jul. 2019.  Available: https://www.ft.com/content/79d9e36e-fd0b-11e6-8d8e-
a5e3738f9ae4.  
16 China - EU trade, European Commission, Ec.europa.eu, 2019, online, Internet, 9 Jul. 2019. 
Available: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/.  
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development strategy based on the existing strategies of the participating 
countries. This will reduce the impact of institutional barriers that restrict trade 
and investment between countries. 
Fourthly, thanks to a series of reforms, including an anti-corruption campaign, 
the new government led by Xi Jinping restored power over economic and 
diplomacy policies. This was achieved by reducing the number of members of 
the Politburo Standing Committee from 9 to 7 and excluding the security 
apparatus and propaganda from the process of forming the most important 
decisions in the country. These changes made it possible to take the BRI beyond 
the interests of various power groups in the country. The lead agency for 
promoting the initiative was created in February 2015 under the leadership of 
Zhang Gaoli, a deputy prime minister of the first rank and a member of the 
Standing Committee of the Politburo, whose work focused on economic issues. 
This body is accountable to the National Commission on Development and 
Reform, which is China’s leading macroeconomic management agency17. In 
addition, the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, local 
provincial and municipal authorities with individual implementation plans, as 
well as public and private corporate actors and investors are involved in the 
implementation of the BRI. Certain financing mechanisms for the BRI have 
already been created, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the 
New Silk Road Fund, as well as banking structures such as the China 
Development Bank, the New Development Bank and the Export Import Bank of 
China. Other major financial sources include China’s sovereign wealth fund and 
its foreign exchange reserves. It is characteristic that in the implementation of 
the initiative do not attend the Ministry of Defense and Security. This shows 
that the focus of this initiative is on economic issues. 
 
17 China sets up leading team on Belt and Road initiatives, China.org.cn, 2019, online, Internet, 9 Jul. 
2019. Available: http://www.china.org.cn/business/2015-03/30/content_35189945.htm.  
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In 2015, the Government of the People’s Republic of China declared a 
comprehensive government program titled “Vision and Actions on Jointly 
Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road". This 
is the most important official document regarding the BRI that clarified the 
general goals of integration. The five main objectives of the BRI are to promote: 
political coordination, interconnection of infrastructure, uninterrupted trade, free 
movement of capital, strengthening proximity between nations. These goals 
make it possible to fully disclose the main directions, methods and forms of the 
“New Silk Road”. 
First, priority is given to political coordination, which according to the authors 
of the project will serve as a guarantee of the final results. This is confirmed by 
the intense activity of the Chinese leadership in strengthening intergovernmental 
cooperation with countries involved in the project. So, the first major Silk Road 
Forum organized by China to raise the status of the project in the eyes of the 
international community was held on May 14-15, 2017. This event allowed Xi 
Jinping to demonstrate China’s connecting role in the modern world, especially 
against the background of events in the United States, where Donald Trump 
announced the “America first” policy, and then withdrew from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership18, as well as the situation in the European Union, which is gradually 
losing its influence in the international arena. China and participating countries 
reaffirmed their commitment to building an open economy, comprehensive 
trade, and countering all forms of protectionism. The forum was attended by 
over 20 heads of foreign states, about 100 foreign ministers, as well as 
leadership of 50 international organizations. The next forum is planned to be 
held in April 2019, and the number of potential participants should increase 
several times. 
 
18 США вышли из Транстихоокеанского партнерства: что дальше?, BBC News Русская служба, 
2019, online, Internet, 11 Jul. 2019. Available: https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-38729182.  
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Secondly, in addition to the construction of the joint Eurasian Land Bridge, a 
proposal was made to ensure the systemic interconnectedness of the 
infrastructures of the countries participating in the project, while coordinating 
plans for the construction of infrastructure facilities and harmonization of 
technical standards systems. The complex nature of communications systems, 
which include not only the railways and highways themselves, but also the 
pipeline network for the transportation of energy resources, as well as the cross-
border network of fiber-optic communication lines is emphasized. An example 
of such infrastructure construction is the Nurly Zhol economic program in 
Kazakhstan aiming to create a new and develop the existing infrastructure of the 
country, which will allow Kazakhstan to fully integrate into the Chinese 
project19.  
Thirdly, the importance of the trade and investment area, which Beijing sees as 
the basis of the entire project, is highlighted. The concept involves discussion 
with the BRI countries matters relating to the formation of free trade zones, 
reduction of tariffs and duties, as well as the implementation of universal 
customs procedures. The same applies to the field of investment. However, 
China stresses that it does not aim to export China’s state capital as the sole 
source. Instead, it seeks to stimulate domestic and foreign private capital, 
including for small support industries. However, although the “Perspectives and 
Actions” mentions market mechanisms, in practice the project is financed by 
large financial institutions and investment groups, as well as Chinese state-
owned enterprises. This is largely due to the fact that they are more inclined to 
take risks for the construction of important infrastructure, and in some cases are 
recipients of investment protection from foreign countries. Major projects will 
be implemented mainly in the framework of bilateral, but also multilateral 
formats.  
 
19 Стратегии и программы Республики Казахстан — Официальный сайт Президента 
Республики Казахстан, Akorda.kz, 2019, online, Internet, 13 Jul. 2019.Available: 
http://www.akorda.kz/ru/official_documents/strategies_and_programs.  
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Finally, “Strengthening proximity between nations” is presented in the 
document by a multi-vector cooperation in the humanitarian sphere: education 
(10,000 scholarships of the PRC government), culture and art, tourism, health 
care, youth policy, science and technology. 
 
2.2. Strategic motives for the initiation of the OBOR Initiative 
Although economic cooperation is usually formed by the government on the 
basis of mutually beneficial cooperation, there are points that the project will be 
used as an instrument of China’s political and economic influence on the 
participating countries. However, in the absence of any official confirmation 
these statements so far reflect one of the possible development ways. Despite 
these uncertainties, it remains obvious that the BRI serves for the 
implementation of both domestic and foreign policy goals. To date, this 
initiative has gone beyond its original concept, including diplomatic, domestic, 
socio-economic, financial, geopolitical interests and based on previously 
existing governmental programs and initiatives. 
More specifically, the main motives for the initiation of the BRI were indicated 
in the “Blue Book of Non-Traditional Security Threats” - 2014 report prepared 
by the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations, which is 
directly related to China’s highest government circles20. The report lists the 
following aspects: 
1) "Protecting China’s national economic security"; 
2) Promoting energy security through the construction of alternative 
transportation routes; 
3) Promoting border security through the development of China’s western 
regions; 
 
20 [余晓峰. 非传统安全蓝皮书：中国非传统安全研究报告 (2014-2015). – 浙江: 浙江大学, 2015. – 144 
页] (Ю. Сяофэн. Синяя книга нетрадиционных угроз безопасности: отчет об исследованиях в 
области безопасности (2014- 2015). – Чжэцзян: университет Чжэцзян, 2015 год. – 144 с.)  
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4) Combating the "three threats" inside and outside the country through 
economic development and the redistribution of wealth; 
5) Assistance to mitigate geopolitical frauds under the leadership of the United 
States; 
6) “Creation of a new multilateral dialogue system” and “a new international 
security system”, which will strengthen China’s national strength and soft 
power. 
 
Let us consider in more detail each of the above points. The main motive for the 
initiation of the BRI is to ensure economic security and development. With the 
stagnation of the global economy, as well as the downturn in the growth of the 
national economy (experts predict the growth rate of the Chinese economy at 
6.5% in 2019, the worst figure since 1990), the BRI can become a tool to 
support China’s economic growth by expanding markets. China will be able to 
ensure the sustainability and balance of its economy by stimulating regional 
demand for industrial and agricultural products. Thus, the BRI is a tool by 
means of which China will be able to expand its economic influence in the 
region at the same time creating new transport routes for the supply of goods in 
the event of trade wars, sanctions (primarily from the US), as well as a ban on 
sea transit through the South China Sea. According to experts of the Stockholm 
international peace research institute, the option of confrontation with the 
United States and its allies is quite likely21. First of all, it is connected with the 
intentions of China to finally solve the Taiwan question, as well as the problem 
of attribution of islands in the South China Sea. Such actions will cause 
dissatisfaction with the United States, as confirmed by President Trump’s 
 
21 Ghiasy, Richard. The Silk Road Economic Belt: Considering security implications and EU–China 
cooperation prospects. – Stockholm: Stockholm international peace research institute, 2017. – P. 5. 
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statement concerning about China’s actions related to China’s construction of 
military facilities in South China Sea22. 
Therefore, one of the goals of China is to create alternative transportation routes 
through land bridges from Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Pakistan. These 
routes mainly pass over land through sovereign states and, thus, will be least 
affected by possible sanctions and trade wars with the United States. 
With the help of OBOR, large state-owned enterprises in construction and other 
industries that suffer from an oversupply of investment will now have more 
alternatives abroad. Although foreign projects may not be as large-scale as 
domestic ones, they would still make it possible to increase the competitiveness 
of such enterprises. In addition to these practical goals, OBOR will allow China 
to get rid of the image of the traditional manufacturer of low-cost goods by 
selling products high-tech manufacturing industries, as well as nuclear energy 
technologies and high-speed rail lines. As labor costs increase in China, the 
initiative will help facilitate the withdrawal of labor-intensive and low-profit 
industries abroad. 
Through the Belt, China will also be able to increase the flow of foreign 
investment, thereby gaining the status of a global development leader. Existing 
development institutions in Western countries are not able to solve the problem 
of large-scale infrastructure deficit in the Asian region, which is estimated at 
about 4 trillion US dollars23. China’s willingness to solve this problem puts it in 
the position of a leader that promotes regional development, relations between 
countries, and also makes it a guarantor of stability in the region. Chinese aid, 
which basically takes the form of loans from banks controlled to one degree or 
another by the Chinese authorities, is not similar to the aid from Western 
countries that put certain conditions. In case of China, there are no requirements 
 
22 Трамп обеспокоен действиями Китая в Южно-Китайском море, РИА Новости, 2019, online, 
Internet, 13 Jul. 2019. Available: https://ria.ru/world/20170405/1491507400.html.  
23 Asia’s $26tn infrastructure gap threatens growth, ADB warns, Financial Times, Ft.com, 2019, 
online, Internet, 13 Jul. 2019. Available: https://www.ft.com/content/79d9e36e-fd0b-11e6-8d8e-
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for the implementation of market reforms or the democratization of the political 
system. However, China demands loyalty from recipient countries on a number 
of issues, including non-recognition of Taiwan’s independence24. Such 
economic cooperation could expand the range of China-friendly countries, as 
well as, if successfully implemented, expand the influence of China’s soft 
power and strengthen neighborhood diplomacy.  
According to the “Excellent Prospects”, the central driving forces of China’s 
economic policy are: the search for new uses of surplus capital; elimination of 
yuan’s insufficient internationalization. These goals can be achieved by 
including the Central Asian countries in the BRI. According to experts, regions 
such as Central Asia with relatively underdeveloped markets may offer 
increased private capital yields and additional revenues for public capital25. 
Moreover, the development of deeper economic relations with the Central Asian 
countries is quite easy, as the Chinese and Central Asian economies 
complement each other: China imports raw materials (energy, ferrous and non-
ferrous metals, and minerals) and is a large and alternative exporter of consumer 
goods and finished products for the economies of Central Asian countries that 
do not have access to the sea. 
Speaking about the investment component, it is worth noting that in contrast to 
investments in more developed countries; a number of developing countries 
along the OBOR provide the opportunity to use yuan as a reference currency, 
that is, the currency used in international trade and financial transactions. This 
will allow China to get the same currency advantages as the US dollar. The 
BRI, if successful, would allow China to translate economic power and capital 
into political influence. 
 
24 Mastro, Oriana Skylar. Stealth superpower: How China hid Its global ambitions. // Foreign affairs, 
2019. – № 98(1). – P. 32.  
25 Hongzhou, Zhang. Building the Silk Road Economic Belt: Problems and Priorities in Central Asia // 
Singapore: RSIS Policy Report, 2015. – P. 3-6.  
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The second driving force of the OBOR is energy security. Between 1989 and 
2011 China had an average economic growth rate of 10%, and since then its 
demand for energy had risen accordingly. In the 1980s, the country moved from 
self-reliance to dependence on external sources about half of its today’s internal 
consumption. 
In the early 2000s, China increased its energy imports from Russia thirty times, 
in order to reduce its dependence on the Middle East and Africa south of the 
Sahara. This was done for two reasons: first, the transportation of energy from 
these two regions took place along sea routes, which were sometimes attacked 
by pirates, as well as delays due to administrative reasons. Secondly, both 
regions suffer from political instability, which can lead to a shortage of 
resources up to the complete cessation of transportation. 
Xi Jinping’s visits to four Central Asian countries in September 2013 were 
aimed at strengthening cooperation on energy and security issues. China being 
the world's largest importer of oil with a growing demand for natural gas is 
constantly trying to diversify its sources of energy supply. To achieve this, 
China is ready to make significant but risky investments. In particular, the 
Pakistani Gwadar port, which is leased by China and is part of the BRI’s 
southern direction, can become an instrument for maintaining China’s access to 
energy resources. It is expected that the transportation of oil to the inner cities of 
China from Gwadar will shorten the delivery time by 85 percent compared with 
the route through the Strait of Malacca. However, it should be noted that this 
route is associated with topographical problems, as well as security threats 
caused by insurgents in Pakistan26. 
Russia remains one of the main oil suppliers to China and has tremendous 
potential for gas exports, as evidenced by the $ 400 billion contract signed by 
the countries in May 2014 for the supply of gas from Eastern Siberia, and the 
 
26 Китай получил в аренду на 40 лет пакистанский порт Гвадар, Regnum.ru, 2019, online, 
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framework agreement signed in November 2014 on the development of a 
second gas supply route from Western Siberia to Xinjiang. The first deliveries 
are scheduled to begin in December 2019, which is almost a month ahead of 
schedule27. 
At the same time, Chinese energy companies, such as CNPC (China National 
Petroleum Corporation), are seeking to expand their presence in Central Asia (in 
particular, in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan), since this region has become an 
important supplier of energy resources for China. Gas pipeline from 
Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan was commissioned in 2009 
and currently supplies over half of the natural gas imported to China. Over the 
next years it is planned to expand the pipeline and double the amount of gas 
imported through this route. At the same time, for the first time oil began to 
flow to China from Kazakhstan via a pipeline in 2006, and in the future it is 
planned to expand these through deliveries from Caspian fields. The gas 
pipeline connecting the offshore gas fields in Myanmar with Yunnan Province 
was built in 2013 and runs parallel to the oil pipeline, which should serve as an 
alternative transit route for crude oil coming from the Middle East and Africa. 
Thirdly, the OBOR aims to develop the western provinces. Since the days of 
Deng Xiaoping and the beginning of the policy of openness, the main task for 
the Chinese government is reducing the uneven development of regions in the 
country. The priorities are poor provinces in the west and in the center of the 
country, starting with those suffering from deep ethnic tensions (including 
Xinjiang and Tibet). The model based on the development of cities by the sea 
— special economic zones run by Deng Xiaoping — cannot be applied in these 
remote inland provinces.  Consequently, Beijing hopes to develop these 
provinces by transferring industry from the eastern provinces to inland areas and 
 
27 Поставки газа из России в Китай по "восточному" маршруту могут начаться раньше 
намеченного срока, Russian.news.cn, 2019, online, Internet, 13 Jul. 2019. Available: 
http://russian.news.cn/2019-03/06/c_137873036.htm.  
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promoting cross-border trade28. Twenty-four provinces, special autonomous 
regions and municipalities were identified in the documents as relevant areas for 
construction and cooperation within the BRI. The governments of other 
provinces had published their own integration plans by October 2015. Indeed, in 
recent years, the internal subjects of China including the government and 
enterprises have been increasingly involved in the integration processes in the 
framework of the project. For example, in May 2015 the Guangdong Province, 
one of the richest coastal provinces, presented 68 investment projects worth 
more than $ 55.4 billion in energy, agriculture, fisheries and manufacturing. 
Their implementation is scheduled for the period from 2015 to 202029. In 
particular, Guangdong seeks to realize these projects by deepening its 
cooperation with Hong Kong and Macao, which have impressive international 
commercial and financial advantages. The construction of the sea zone “The 
Guangdong - Hong Kong - Macao Greater Bay” and the strengthening of the 
construction of ports in 15 coastal cities, including Shanghai and Guangzhou, as 
well as in smaller cities are envisaged for this purpose. The rich Fujian province 
is also defined as the main zone of the Maritime Silk Road. 
Another striking example is the southern province of Yunnan, which gradually 
under Hu Jintao became an economic bridge to Southeast Asia, especially to the 
Greater Mekong Subregion. The autonomous region of Ningxia in western 
China with a Muslim population of about 2.17 million people has great chances 
of becoming an international center for Islamic banking and finance, 
strengthening China’s cooperation with Arab countries. It is expected that 
within ten years, the volume of Sino-Arab trade will reach 600 billion dollars. 
The Chinese authorities are paying particular attention to the Xinjiang Uygur 
Autonomous Region, which is considered the “main region” and major 
 
28 Ekman, Alice. China in Asia: What is behind the new silk roads? – Paris & Brussels: French 
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29 中国（广东）自由贸易试验区总体方案, Yidaiyilu.gov.cn, 2019, online, Internet, 14 Jul. 2019. 
Available: https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/zcfg/36744.htm.  
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economic center, connecting China with other Eurasian markets. Xinjiang 
borders at least eight countries and connects the region with the Indian Ocean 
through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which is an important link in 
the southern direction of the project30. 
Stability and prosperity in neighboring countries would help accelerate 
economic growth and strengthen social stability in Xinjiang, where the problem 
of separatism is acute, and which borders on such unstable states as Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. Speaking of Xinjiang, it is worth noting that it occupies the 25th 
place out of 29 provinces in terms of welfare and is among the least developed 
regions of China31. The majority of the population of the province is Uyghur 
Muslims - ethnic minority that has long claimed territorial independence. There 
have been several terrorist attacks in China in recent years, the largest of which 
was the attack in Urumqi on May 22, 2014, which resulted in the death of 39 
people and more than 90 were injured32. To preserve its territorial integrity, the 
Chinese government has taken measures to combat what it calls the "Three 
Threats" (religious extremism, separatism and terrorism). The desire to ensure 
the development of the province and reduce the dissatisfaction of the local 
population led to the change in Beijing's “stability first” policy, introduced in 
2010 year, on a strategy of accelerated regional economic development. Part of 
this strategy involves promoting export of goods produced in Xinjiang to the 
Central Asian countries. According to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, 
economic cooperation can help to address the deep-rooted causes of instability 
and radicalization in the underdeveloped Asian countries, which, according to 
China, are located on the periphery of the global system. Although the causes of 
 
30 Xinjiang's Construction Plan for Development of a Transport Center on the Silk Road Economic 
Belt from 2016 to 2030, Yidaiyilu.gov.cn, 2019, online, Internet, 14 Jul. 2019. Available: 
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extremism do not always depend on economic well-being and tend to be more 
context-sensitive, China’s actions certainly deserve attention, and the OBOR 
can contribute to "buffer" of more stable states around China. Xinjiang's foreign 
trade amounted to $ 27.56 billion in 2013; the volume of trade with five Central 
Asian countries exceeded $ 19 billion and reached 70% of the total foreign trade 
turnover of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)33. The largest 
partner of Xinjiang in 2014 was Kazakhstan, which accounted for about 46% of 
the foreign trade. This trend shows Kazakhstan’s desire to attract the 
overwhelming part of the continental freight traffic from Asia to Europe, to 
increase the volume of transit cargo from 117 million tons in 2014 to 170 
million tons in 2020 and to increase revenues from Eurasian transit from $ 800 
million to $ 2 billion in 2020 and $ 10 billion in 205034. Given the growing 
exports of the province, most of which are already going to the Central Asian 
countries, the creation of an economic belt of the Silk Road would make it 
possible to increase exports from Xinjiang, thereby guaranteeing further 
economic development in the region. According to 2018, the province’s foreign 
trade turnover increased to $ 43 billion, while Kazakhstan ranked first with a 
volume of $ 15 billion35. 
Fourthly, the OBOR is closely connected with the more active position of the 
Xi Jinping administration on regional security issues. According to the "New 
Security Concept Asia”in 2014, China is interested in creating a new order in 
the field of security in Asia through multilateral cooperation. This makes it 
possible once again to be convinced of Beijing’s desire to reconsider its position 
in international relations and consolidate the status of a world power, which 
 
33 Объем экспорта и импорта частных предприятий в СУАР вырос на 7.7, Rg, 2019, online, 
Internet, 14 Jul. 2019. Available: https://regnum.ru/news/economy/1753755.html.  
34 В 2017 году Синьцзян выделит 200 млрд юаней на строительство автодорог, 
Russian.news.cn, 2019, online, Internet, 14 Jul. 2019. Available: http://russian.news.cn/2017-
01/28/c_136017244.htm.  
35 Xinjiang foreign trade with B&R countries rises in 2018 - Xinhua | English.news.cn, Xinhuanet.com, 
2019, online, Internet, 14 Jul. 2019. Available: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-
02/15/c_137824227.htm.  
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plays a much larger role in determining the agenda. However, this concept goes 
beyond traditional common safety issues. It is based on the primary role of 
development, the key components of which are communications and 
infrastructure. At the same time, the evolution of the OBOR itself is likely to 
force China to move away from its traditional non-interference diplomacy and 
commit itself to increased political participation and security cooperation with 
the states participating in this initiative. 
The PRC’s government is also concerned about a possible “domino effect”, 
when political instability in neighboring states may spill over into its western 
provinces. China’s concern was evident in 2005 during the Tulip Revolution in 
Kyrgyzstan and the May 2005 Andijan Uprising in Uzbekistan. Strengthening 
relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the three countries that 
border restless Xinjiang province, is fundamental to Beijing for both economic 
and ethnic reasons - for Beijing, providing the growth of a province’s welfare 
guarantees stability and security. In addition, Central and South Asia are areas 
to which Beijing pays special attention, given the changing security challenges 
at the western borders of China, which, in particular, is connected with the 
withdrawal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops from 
Afghanistan at the end of 2014. Thus, the OBOR fits into the Chinese agenda on 
expanding its engagement with regional states on development and security 
issues in Asia. 
Fifth, the basis of the OBOR initiative is infrastructure development in the 
region. Since its announcement, at every meeting between the Chinese leader 
and his regional colleagues focused on “interconnectedness” and the creation of 
cross-border infrastructure projects. Investment growth is most noticeable in 
this sector, and introducing new financing instruments in the form of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Silk Road Fund, etc., as well as the 
recapitalization of the largest banks (for example, the China Development 
Bank) to finance regional infrastructure projects, this trend will only increase. 
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So, in February 2019, China announced the list of 300 large construction 
projects for the next year, 100 of which relate to the field of infrastructure 
construction36. For Beijing, this rapid infrastructure development plan has 
several goals. First of all, China wants to develop interregional infrastructure 
and transport networks (ports, road and railways), which over time could 
enhance the exchange of goods within the region and most importantly the 
delivery of Chinese goods to European markets by land as is an alternative 
route. There is already a direct rail freight line, opened in May 2013, connecting 
China with Poland and Germany - average travel time is 16 days, which is three 
weeks faster than shipping goods from China’s eastern provinces. There is also 
a more complex project for the long term, namely the construction of high-
speed transcontinental rail lines between China and Europe37. 
In addition, China also creates its own network of ports. Chinese firms are 
increasingly involved in projects for the creation of this kind of infrastructure 
abroad (Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and other countries) and the inclusion 
of these projects in the “New Maritime Silk Road”. China understands well 
what the development of transport infrastructure is and gradually strengthens 
the material and technical capabilities of the country, which ultimately can 
become a reliable geostrategic foundation. 
Despite the absence of any official maps of the BRI, there are number of 
economic corridors by land and sea, which include both used routes, and 
potentially new ones. These include38: 
1. China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor. Includes two economic 
corridors. One begins in northern China, passes through Hohhot, Inner 
 
36 Пекин обнародовал список 300 крупных строительных проектов на этот год, Russian.news.cn, 
2019, online, Internet, 14 Jul. 2019. Available: http://russian.news.cn/2019-02/28/c_137857451.htm.  
37 European Commission Press release - EU-China Summit: deepening the strategic global 
partnership, Europa.eu, 2019, online, Internet, 14 Jul. 2019. Available: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-18-4521_en.htm.  
38 Mapping the Belt and Road initiative: this is where we stand | Mercator Institute for China Studies, 
Merics.org, 2019, online, Internet, 14 Jul. 2019. Available: https://www.merics.org/en/bri-
tracker/mapping-the-belt-and-road-initiative.  
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Mongolia, and reaches Mongolia and Russia. Another corridor starts in 
Northeast China, passes through Manchuria and reaches Chita, Russia. 
Both pass through the Trans-Siberian Railway connecting China with 
Europe. 
2. The New Eurasian Land Bridge. Economic corridor divided into three 
parts, which connect Lianyungang, Jiangsu Province, with the port of 
Rotterdam in the Netherlands. In the future may be connected to Japan, 
South Korea and Europe via Lianyungang. There is a road project from 
Iran and Russia to Hungary through Kazakhstan. Covers over 30 
countries. The northern route originates in the capital of XUAR - Urumqi, 
passes through the territory of Kazakhstan, where it is branched into two 
parts: one branch goes through Aktobe and Uralsk, where it bypasses the 
Caspian Sea from the north, and then integrates into the transport 
communications of Russia along the route China-Kazakhstan-Russia-
Belarus-Europe. The second branch of the northern route follows through 
the Khorgos checkpoint, which is the largest road border crossing in the 
western part of the country and constantly opens for border crossing. 
Then, bypassing Central Asian countries, as well as Russia, goes to the 
Caspian Sea through Kazakhstan. Includes regions rich in oil and various 
mineral resources that will serve as a source of energy for China. The 
central route is an important part of the OBOR, representing the second 
most important direction of continental transport of goods. Allows 
ensuring the transportation of export cargoes from the countries of the 
Asia-Pacific Region and China to Europe and Persian Gulf. The central 
route in the direction of China-Kazakhstan Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-
European countries will provide direct access to the PRC and three 
Central Asian countries to Europe, to the major trading ports of Bandar 
Abbas in the Persian Gulf and Chahbehar in the Gulf of Oman. The 
southern part is a 3,000-kilometer route connecting Kashgar, Xinjiang 
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Uygur Autonomous Region with the port of Gwadar in Pakistan. In 
addition to the development of the port of Gwadar, an agreement between 
China and Pakistan was reached on broad cooperation in areas such as 
energy, infrastructure and industry. 
3. The China‐Indochinese Peninsula Economic Corridor. Starts in Nanning, 
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Kunming, Yunnan Province, 
and ends in Singapore. China has entered into a free trade agreement with 
ASEAN and leads the development cooperation of the Greater Mekong 
Subregion. However, the economic corridor faces great difficulties due to 
tensions in the South China Sea. 
4. The Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor. Through 
this economic corridor China can develop ties with Bangladesh and India, 
with those it historically has not had close connections. 
5. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Consists of routes from the South 
China Sea and the Indian Ocean to Europe and America, as well as routes 
from the South China Sea to Latin American countries having access to 
the South Pacific. China will concentrate its investments in 15 port cities, 
including Shanghai, Tianjin, Ningbo and Zhoushan in order to create the 
Maritime Silk Road. 
 
Last but not least, in addition to investments in transport, telecommunications 
and energy infrastructure, Beijing is also trying to export its model of industrial 
parks in various countries along the BRI: in India, Belarus (Chinese-Belarusian 
Industrial Park near Minsk), Kazakhstan (Kazakh-Chinese Agricultural 
Scientific Industrial Park of the Silk Road in the Zhambyl region), and also 
seeks to create similar projects in Sri Lanka and other countries of the region. 
This is not a new idea: China has already tried to export projects of industrial 
zones to other parts of the world (for example, to Egypt), and under Xi Jinping 
these aspirations have intensified many times, despite questions about the 
40 
 
effectiveness and investment attractiveness of such zones, which do not always 
bring benefit. 
 
2.3. The main challenges in the realization of the OBOR 
Despite China’s optimism regarding the OBOR, today, Beijing has faced a 
number of problems in Europe and Central Asia. It’s worth starting with the fact 
that the BRI is seen by many as a tool to achieve diplomatic and strategic goals 
through the use of economic power. This causes concern among the countries of 
the region, as it is believed that the initiative will strengthen China’s influence 
on them. Countries such as India, Japan, and the United States view OBOR as a 
threat to their regional interests. Although China seeks to downplay the strategic 
aspects of the initiative, many researchers agree that the BRI is a response to US 
policy in Asia over the past decades. 
The Chinese leadership pays close attention to how the initiative is perceived in 
the world, and adjusts its approach accordingly. During the Silk Road Forum, 
Xi Jinping repeated many times that “OBOR is not a geopolitical project of the 
Cold War era, but, on the contrary, opens up new ways for mutually beneficial 
cooperation”39. Nonetheless, OBOR is a complex project and geopolitical 
challenges will be a serious obstacle to its implementation. For example, Central 
Asia, which is a key component of the project, is politically and in the area of 
security a volatile region with serious internal conflicts caused by unresolved 
border, water and energy disputes, regional rivalry and deep distrust. The 
implementation of the Maritime Silk Road is even more complex due to the 
situation in Southeast Asia and contradictions in the South China Sea. 
Last but not least, problems are caused by the activities of financial institutions 
responsible for project’s implementation. This is mainly due to the functioning 
of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). According to the expert of 
 
39 Си Цзиньпин: менталитет "холодной войны" и "игры с нулевой суммой" является 
устаревшим, Russian.news.cn, 2019, online, Internet, 16 Jul. 2019. Available: 
http://russian.news.cn/2018-04/10/c_137100248.htm.  
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the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies Ivetta Frolova, China by developing 
investment projects of the AIIB will primarily pursue its own goals40. This 
bank, in which only China in fact has the right to “veto” with its 26% capital, 
cannot be considered an international institution in the full sense, and it is more 
correct to regard the AIIB as a Chinese bank with some international 
participation. The expert considers that the only reason for the participation of 
European countries in them is the urgent need for a “new push, a new economic 
force and an engine that could pull of Europe’s economy”. Another important 
problem to be solved is the dependence of enterprises on government loans. In 
January 2019, China’s state-owned banks provided record loans to enterprises in 
the amount of 477 billion dollars, regardless of profitability.41 
Some researchers also believe that already in the early stages of the 
implementation, the project faces problems of a partial restriction of state 
sovereignty, ensuring national interests and features of the political systems of 
the participating countries42. Chinese transactions often take place behind closed 
doors, based on building ties with the political elite, which is suspicious of both 
lower-level officials and ordinary citizens. This leads to protest movements 
among the local population. Thus, the transfer of the port of Hambantota in Sri 
Lanka for rent to China led to mass protests in 2017-201843. At the end of 2013, 
China financed the construction of the first oil refinery in Kyrgyzstan, freeing 
the country from complete dependence on Russia in this area. However, in 
2014, the plant was suspended for several months due to demonstrations by 
 
40 Фролова, И. Ю. Китайский проект «Экономический пояс Шёлкового пути»: развитие, 
проблемы, перспективы // Проблемы национальной стратегии. – 2016. – №5. – С. 54. 
41 China banks lend record $477bn new loans in January, Gulf-Times, 2019, online, Internet, 16 Jul. 
2019. , Available: https://www.gulf-times.com/story/622316/China-banks-lend-record-477bn-new-
loans-in-Jan.  
42 Securing the Belt and Road initiative / Edited by Alessandro Arduino. – Shanghai: Shanghai 
Academy of Social Sciences, 2018. – 311 p. 
43 Sri Lankans Protest Against Its Government’s Leasing of a Major Port to China, 
www.theepochtimes.com, 2019, online, Internet, 16 Jul. 2019. Available: 
https://www.theepochtimes.com/sri-lankans-protest-against-its-governments-leasing-of-a-major-port-
to-china_2657586.html.  
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local residents, who demanded the liquidation of the plant, as it pollutes the 
environment. 
One of the urgent problems is the transport security. Although Chinese state-
owned enterprises are expanding their international capabilities, they are still 
not able to provide adequate security, since a number of countries along routes 
either unstable, or they have ethnic and religious tensions. In turn, investors lack 
legal protection in their operations in some countries, and infrastructure and 
personnel are exposed to political risks and violence.44 
Speaking about “connections between people”, it is worth noting its less 
effective implementation. Despite the establishment of Confucius institutes in 
many universities of the world, as well as expert-analytical centers on relations 
with China, many people still have a negative image of the country. In addition, 
there is an acute shortage of specialists with knowledge of Chinese and customs 
procedures, which impedes the implementation of the project. The Asian 
Society report states that “Beijing should focus on expanding its cultural and 
charitable activities in Central Asia and Europe, promoting student exchange 
programs and investing in projects outside energy sector". In such a situation, 
Beijing should encourage the spread of Chinese culture through the promotion 
of Chinese language, culture and history. It is worth doing this not only through 
official state channels, but also through NGOs and NGOs. This action is already 
underway. One of the main results of the Chinese strategy aimed at enhancing 
cultural interaction in the framework of the BRI is the creation of "Eurasia - Silk 
Road" for cultural cooperation. Agreement on the establishment of the 
organization was reached during the Second Great Silk Road International 
Cultural Forum held in Moscow on September 14-15, 2015 and was organized 
 
44 Securing the Belt and Road initiative / Edited by Alessandro Arduino. – Shanghai: Shanghai 
Academy of Social Sciences, 2018. – P. 5. 
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by the Chinese Foundation of Culture and Arts of Nations, the Silk Road 
Fund45. 
China put a lot of effort into emphasizing the open and joint nature of the BRI 
during the 2017 forum. It also intends to address issues related to standards and 
governance transparency that have been the subject of criticism for decades. 
Also in recent years, China has actively sought to comply with international 
environmental and social standards in policies of enterprises. A major step to 
achieve these goals was the establishment in October 2018 of the Union of 
Cities "Belts and Ways" for international cooperation in the field of credibility, 
the first members of which were 35 states. According to the statements of the 
participants, the union is intended to create an international platform for 
exchanges and cooperation between cities in an appropriate area, through which 
a culture of honest behavior will develop, the business environment will 
improve, interconnectedness and trade and investment cooperation of the BRI 
cities will be promoted46.   
Thus, the establishment of a number of platforms for multilateral dialogue, as 
well as the creation of financial institutions to which third countries are allowed 
demonstrates China’s desire to comply with international standards in the field 
of financing various projects and its desire to actively solve the problems of 
implementing the Belt and Road. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 Tim Winter, "One Belt, One Road, One Heritage: Cultural Diplomacy and the Silk Road", The 
Diplomat, 2019, online, Internet, 16 Jul. 2019. Available: http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/one-belt-one-
road-one-heritage-cultural-diplomacy-and-the-silk-road/.  
46 Создан Союз городов "Пояса и пути" по международному сотрудничеству в области кредита 
доверия, Russian.news.cn, 2019, online, Internet, 16 Jul. 2019. Available: 
http://russian.news.cn/2018-10/21/c_137548683.htm.  
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III CHAPTER. China-EU relations in the framework of the OBOR 
 
3.1. Dynamics of political, economic and trade relations between the EU and 
China until 2013  
Since the mid-1960s China’s foreign policy has been characterized by 
increasing confrontation with the USSR, which has resulted in the actual rupture 
between the parties, despite a formal treaty of friendship, union and mutual 
assistance. Under such circumstances, China started to seek opportunities to 
cooperate with the countries of the Western bloc, which saw China as the center 
of opposition to the “Soviet hegemonism" in Asia. In 1963 the Deputy Minister 
of Foreign Trade of China Lu Xuzhang toured Western European countries and, 
in particular, held talks on the expansion of economic relations between the 
PRC and France. In that same year former Prime Minister of France Edgar 
Faure visited Beijing with an unofficial mission to conduct preliminary 
negotiations with China’s leadership on the official recognition of the PRC and 
the restoration of diplomatic relations between Paris and Beijing47. As a result, 
in January 1964 France became the first Western European country to establish 
with the PRC diplomatic relations at the level of embassies. In 1970 China 
established official diplomatic relations with Italy, in 1971 - with Austria, 
Belgium, Iceland, San Marino; in 1972 - with the Netherlands, Germany, 
Greece, Malta, Luxembourg and the UK; in 1973 - with Spain, in 1974 - with 
Portugal and Ireland. 
Official relations between Beijing and Brussels were established in 1975, which 
laid the legal foundation for further cooperation between China, the EEC and 
Member States. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that until the mid-1980s, the 
basis for relations between the parties was precisely trade and economic 
 
47 Виноградов, А.О. К истории формирования отношений КНР-ЕС /А.О. Виноградов, М.О. Лущик 
// Китай в мировой и региональной политике. История и современность, 2017. – №22. – С. 353.   
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cooperation, and not political48. In 1978 China and the EEC signed a trade 
agreement in which the parties pledged to grant each other preferential 
treatment. In 1985 China and the EU signed an agreement on trade and 
economic cooperation, which envisaged cooperation in the field of industry, 
agriculture, science and technology, energy, transport, environmental 
protection. In 1988 China and EEC sent each other diplomatic missions. 
There was a crisis in relations related to the events on Tiananmen Square in 
1989, which resulted in sanctions imposed on China, including arms embargo. 
However, it quickly became clear that the sanctions were damaging not only 
China facing the threat of international isolation, but also Europe, deprived of a 
promising market for its products49. Thus, although some sanctions remained in 
force, relations between China and the EEC were restored due to the 
predominance of economic and trade interests over political. 
In 1994 the European Commission, those role in the Union’s foreign policy 
decision-making process expanded after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, 
prepared and published a policy document entitled “Towards a New Asia” 
proclaiming the need to expand EU’s economic presence in Asia50. Since then, 
the EU has constantly updated its strategy, goals, priority areas and instruments 
for implementing the policy between the EU and China, depending on the 
changing international situation. In turn, China also sought to more actively 
develop cooperation with the EU. In 1996, on the proposal of the EU China 
agreed to start a joint dialogue on human rights, which for several years put an 
end to the diplomatic confrontation on this issue. 
In 1998, the first EU-PRC Summit took place at the highest level, which marked 
the beginning of direct strategic interaction on economy, politics, human rights, 
 
48  China-EU relations / Edited by Hong Zhou. – Singapore: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2017. – 
P. 4.  
49 Виноградов, А.О. К истории формирования отношений КНР-ЕС /А.О. Виноградов, М.О. Лущик 
// Китай в мировой и региональной политике. История и современность, 2017. – №22. – С. 356. 
50 Towards a new Asia strategy. Communication from the Commission to the Council. COM (94) 314 
final, 13 July 1994 - Archive of European Integration, University of Pittsburgh, Aei.pitt.edu, 2019, 
online, Internet, 16 Jul. 2019. Available: http://aei.pitt.edu/2949/.  
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etc51. In 2000 China and the EU developed a common position on the 
consequences of China’s accession to the WTO for the purpose of cooperation 
within the framework of a single trade mechanism. In 1998, China and the EU 
signed an agreement on the creation of the "Cooperative Partnership", which in 
2001 was proclaimed comprehensive. In October 2003 EU officially prepared 
the fifth policy document on relations with China52, and in turn, Beijing in the 
same month issued its first policy document on cooperation with EU53. These 
documents were largely similar in content: recognized the value of bilateral 
relations, highlighted the general areas of interaction as well as prospects for 
cooperation.  
The first 2-3 years following the promulgation of the Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership experts call the "honeymoon" in bilateral relations54. Frequent visits 
were made at a high level, and China established a bilateral strategic partnership 
with France and UK, and with several EU Member States in Southern Europe. 
2004 was declared “Year of Europe” in China, and “Year of China” in the EU. 
After the EU enlargement in 2004 the Union became China’s largest trading 
partner, and China became the EU’s second largest trading partner after US55. 
At the same time China’s economy grew rapidly, reaching 10% per year. 
However, the "honeymoon" did not last long. In October 2006, the European 
Commission published a new policy document entitled “EU-China: Closer 
partners, growing responsibilities”. “Realistic interaction issues” and 
 
51 EU-China summit: joint press statement, Chinese-embassy.org.uk, 2019, online, Internet, 16 Jul. 
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52 EU strategy towards China, Eur-lex.europa.eu, 2019, online, Internet, 16 Jul. 2019. Available: 
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53 China's policy paper on EU, Chinamission.be, 2019, online, Internet, 16 Jul. 2019. Available: 
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“competition and partnership” were key phrases of the document56. New more 
skeptical leaders towards China came to power in Europe in 2006-2007: Angela 
Merkel in Germany, Nicolas Sarkozy in France, Gordon Brown in the UK, EU 
foreign trade commissioner Peter Mandelson57. The contradictions between 
China and the EU have intensified, and in some areas even regressed. First, 
there has been no significant progress on resolving China’s concern: granting 
market economy status and lifting the arms embargo. Secondly, controversy has 
intensified on issues such as Iran’s nuclear program and the expansion of 
China’s presence in Africa. Thirdly, human rights have again become the 
subject of controversy. The EU has repeatedly expressed its dissatisfaction with 
China’s actions related to the adoption of the Anti-separatism Law in early 2005 
(Anti-secession Law), as well as a refusal to ratify the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. The problem of Tibet was particularly acute. Heads 
of state and government of the three major powers, namely Britain, France and 
Germany, met with Dalai Lama, forcing China to postpone the 11th China-EU 
Summit, which originally planned to be held in France. Thus, the EU-China 
relations in 2008 were at an all-time low58. 
Obviously, this state of relations was detrimental to both parties’ economic 
interests. The EU needed an inflow of foreign investment, while China sought 
to further expand its economic presence in Europe and gain access to European 
technology. Relations began to return to normal by 2009 thanks to a series of 
steps on both sides. First, in early 2009 Premier Wen Jiabao made “Tour of 
Confidence” in European countries, which played an important role in restoring 
political trust between the parties. Secondly, the largest EU countries, such as 
 
56 EU – China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities. Communication from the Commission to the 
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the United Kingdom and Germany, became the first European countries to take 
measures to restore relations with China. In January, the UK published the first 
ever position document on interaction with China, in which the priority task was 
to build a trust based relations with Beijing59.  
During Wen Jiabao’s visit to Germany on January 29, the governments made a 
joint statement about efforts to stabilize the economic situation in the world. In 
addition, shortly before the beginning of the G20 financial summit, a press 
release from China and France was published, in which had been reported that 
the parties were ready to normalize relations and seek to continue cooperation in 
various fields. 
The 12th China-EU Summit took place in Nanjing on November 30, 2009. Both 
sides unanimously recognized the importance of strategic partnership, and also 
signed a joint declaration, which noted that after a series of setbacks relations 
between China and the EU had returned to the right path. Also it was 
emphasized that “....in a complex and ever changing international context EU-
China relations increasingly transcend the bilateral framework and take on an 
international dimension...EU-China relations enjoy a broad strategic foundation 
and the significance of cooperation between the two sides is becoming more 
evident”60. 
Following 2009, relations between China and the EU continued to change for 
the better. In August 2010, a high-level China-EU strategic dialogue was 
officially launched. In December of the same year, the EU High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Politics Security prepared report on the strategic 
partnership of the European Union and other countries, in which among the nine 
listed strategic partners China ranked second after US. 
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In general, despite the overcoming some of problems, relations between China 
and the EU at that stage were characterized by both ups and downs. For 
example, the British Prime Minister Cameron met with the Dalai Lama in May 
2012, and Catherine Ashton, as High Representative of the EU, had repeatedly 
criticized China’s policy towards Tibet. 
However, the above problems did not stop further strengthening of relations. 10 
years have passed since establishment of the China-EU Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership between in 2013.  In May, Chinese Prime Minister Li 
Keqiang visited four countries in Europe and Asia, including Germany and 
Switzerland. In this regard, Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that the inclusion 
of the European direction in new Prime Minister Li Keqiang’s first state visit 
shows a special place of Europe in China’s common foreign policy strategy61. 
Certain steps were also taken by the EU: EU High Representative Catherine 
Ashton visited China at the end of April and held the first high-level talks with 
China’s new administration. She mentioned that “Bilateral relations will be 
given a new impetus with advent of the PRC’s new leadership, which will allow 
a better understanding of the situation in the world, and also further expand 
cooperation”. 
It should also be mentioned trade dynamics between countries in the period 
preceding the announcement of the BRI. The starting point is to take 2003 - the 
year of the signing of an agreement on strategic partnership. The trade turnover 
between China and the EU continuously increased more than four times 
between 2003 and 2013. According to the Ministry of Trade of China and 
Eurostat, China’s exports to the EU increased from $ 72.16 billion in 2003 to $ 
280.1 in 2013. China's imports from the EU grew from $ 53.06 billion in 2003 
to $ 148.1 billion in 2013, which is almost three times more than in 2003. The 
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total trade volume increased 4.3 times from $ 125.22 billion in 2003 to $ 428.2 
billion in 201362.  
China-EU trade during this period experienced a double drop. The first fall 
occurred in both China’s foreign trade and China-EU trade due to the impact of 
the global financial crisis. After the lowest indices in 2009, trade quickly 
recovered and exceeded the pre-crisis level. However, the European debt crisis 
slowed development trade and led to a decrease in domestic demand in Europe. 
China-EU trade again declined in 2012. Meanwhile, although China’s foreign 
trade had suffered and slowed, it still maintained some growth momentum. This 
indicates a significant progress in China’s market diversification strategy - the 
impact of the European debt crisis on the economy was less than the impact of 
the financial crisis. The main problem of trade relations in this period was the 
trade balance deficit, which continuously increased over the entire period. So, if 
in 2003 it was $ 19.1 billion, then by 2013 it had increased to $ 132 billion63. 
 
3.2. Interaction of the PRC and EU institutions within the OBOR 
Thus, China-EU relations were quite high by the launch of the initiative. In 
August 2013, parties signed the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for 
Cooperation, which outlined the development plan of relations64. It is interesting 
that the Chinese side bypassed the future draft and did not make any hints about 
its existence when discussing document, despite to the fact that it became 
known about him a month after the China-EU summit. In 2014 Xi Jinping made 
an official visit to Brussels - the head of China visited EU headquarters for the 
first time in 40 years. However, in a joint statement of March 31, 2014, the 
Chinese project (designated as an initiative at that time) was given only one 
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line, in which “both sides decided to develop synergies between EU policies and 
China's “Silk Road Economic Belt” initiative and jointly to explore common 
initiatives along these lines”65.  
The Chinese government realized that EU institutions play a central role when it 
comes to Chinese investment and coordinating various projects with EU 
member states. For Brussels compliance with open market mechanisms and 
rules, as well as the strategic priorities of the Union, is the most important 
condition for successful cooperation in the BRI. In turn, the European 
Commission and the European External Action Service understood that the 
OBOR has strong political support in China and that its implementation does 
not depend on the position taken by the EU. This made Brussels seek for ways 
to incorporate in this initiative and influence it. 
2015 marked 40 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
China and the EU, and in the same year China published the first policy 
document on the Belt and Road66. The response from the EU institutions to the 
publication was relatively obscure. Only in the resolution of the European 
Parliament of December 16, 2015 “the launch of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ 
initiative aimed at constructing major energy and communication links across 
Central, West and South Asia as far as Europe”67 was taken into account. 
So far, the EU has not developed a full-fledged strategic approach to interacting 
with the BRI and its influence on regional dynamics, since China’s true motives 
and interests not fully understood. In September 2015, the European 
Commission and the Government of China signed an agreement to create a 
 
65 European Commission Press release - Joint Statement: Deepening the EU-China Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership for mutual benefit, Europa.eu, 2019, online, Internet, 18 Jul. 2019. Available: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-89_en.htm.  
66 Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk 
Road, Fmprc.gov.cn, 2019, online, Internet, 18 Jul. 2019. Available: 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1249618.shtml.  
67 European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2015 on EU-China relations, Wednesday, 16 
December 2015, Europarl.europa.eu, 2019, online, Internet, 18 Jul. 2019. Available: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2015-0458_EN.html?redirect.  
52 
 
platform for cooperation68 between the EU and the PRC in order to strengthen 
cooperation in areas such as infrastructure, equipment, technology and 
management standards, as well as the search for opportunities for linking the 
OBOR and Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T)69. In addition, this 
platform was designed to identify opportunities for investment cooperation 
between the Silk Road Fund and the European Fund for Strategic Investments. 
In this regard, China expressed its desire to contribute about € 5-10 billion to the 
European Strategic Investment Fund, which was created by the European 
Commission to attract € 315 billion in order to stimulate growth and 
employment70. Until 2017, the activity of this platform was not evident due to 
contradictions between the sides. At the Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing 
on May 14-15, 2017 European Commission Vice President for Jobs, Growth, 
Investment and Competitiveness Jyrki Katainen presented EU’s vision for 
improving connectivity between Europe and Asia, which can be considered step 
towards developing a common EU-China cooperation policy on the BRI. After 
the results of the 19th EU China Summit, the sides signed Memorandum of 
Understanding on a dialogue in the area of the State aid control regime and the 
Fair Competition Review System on June 2, 201771. Following the signing of 
this document, a short-term plan for linking the infrastructure strategies of the 
European Union and China was published, and a list of 34 pilot projects in the 
field of joint infrastructure implementation was published in July 201872. The 
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EU’s special attention to the development of its own infrastructure networks is 
primarily due to the fact that it is a prerequisite for completing the creation of a 
single market. The previously mentioned TEN-T launched in 2013 can be 
considered the most fundamental since the emergence of a common EU policy 
in the field of infrastructure in 1980. According to the documents, it will have to 
consist of 9 major Corridors: two North-South Corridors, three East-West 
Corridors, and four Diagonal Corridors73. 
Successful cooperation in the field of infrastructure can become the basis for 
interaction in ensuring regional stability and sustainable development in third 
countries participating in the project. So, the Chinese project can complement 
already existing such EU programs as: 
 
● Joint Plan of Action for Central Asia under the United Nations Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy; 
● EU program to combat cross-border drug trafficking; 
● Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA); 
● Border Management Northern Afghanistan (BOMNAF);  
● Central Asia Drug Action Programme (CADAP); 
● Preventing distribution of CBRN materials. 
 
It should be noted that BRI projects outside the European Union also play an 
important role in China-EU relations. These include infrastructure projects in 
Africa and Asia, in which European companies or investors participate. In 2014 
China initiated the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 
main activity of which is focused on financing promising infrastructure projects. 
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18 EU member states are members of the AIIB as of 2019. This prompted 
Brussels to develop common rules for European states to coordinate actions 
within this bank, in particular when voting on financing infrastructure projects74.  
The development of cooperation between the EU and China in the field of 
infrastructure, investment and trade presents a number of problems. The main 
one is bilateral trade imbalances. For example, trains from China are fully 
loaded with goods, while trains in the opposite direction often depart with a 
noticeably smaller amount of products. This shows dependence of the BRI on 
strong support from the Chinese state capital. In the EU this is largely due to 
market mechanisms. The government constantly allocates subsidies for the 
transportation of goods in order to preserve the competitiveness of Chinese 
enterprises in the EU markets in such high-tech areas as the automotive industry 
and electronics. In addition, Chinese subsidies are aimed not only at providing a 
competitive advantage to Chinese goods by reducing logistics costs, but also at 
sustainment of employment. In recent years China has sought to address the 
problem of dependence on government subsidies and correct trade imbalances 
with the EU. In practice, this led to the decrease in tax rates for a number of 
imported consumer goods in the spring of 201975. 
Another difficulty is the incompatibility between the Chinese projects and some 
EU legislative initiatives. Some experts believe that the ongoing Berlin process 
is an intergovernmental initiative led by Germany to support the integration 
processes in the EU - is a tool for the EU to limit the Chinese presence and 
maintain its own influence in the Balkans76. 
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In order to increase EU’s involvement in the project, China needs to develop 
and promote a detailed unified approach to interacting with the EU countries 
both at the political level and at the business level. Beijing’s lack of a well-
defined set of guidelines for project implementation fits the logic of the 
traditional Chinese pragmatic and flexible strategy, which changes depending 
on the new reality in international relations. However, this approach leads to 
ambiguity in other countries that are potential partners in the initiative. On the 
one hand, thanks to the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank, China has strengthened its economic diplomacy and enhanced its status 
as a reliable partner. At the same time, the lack of communication with political 
circles in countries that China considers to be key partners in the strategic 
planning of OBOR has led some of them to take this initiative with suspicion 
and skepticism. An example is India’s response to Pakistan’s participation in the 
initiative. Indian government circles believe that the initiative is a tool for China 
to limit India’s geopolitical influence77. In addition, the participation of the 
Middle East countries in the project is still described by common characteristics 
without a detailed action plan. Such an opaque situation regarding the true 
intentions of China in the framework of the BRI also causes misunderstanding 
in Europe. The situation is also adversely affected by complex relations between 
EU institutions and its member states. For example, Greece, Poland and Italy 
are most actively seeking to pair their infrastructure with the Chinese project, 
while other EU member states have not yet developed an approach to interact 
with China. This is eliciting mixed reaction from the EU Commission. In March 
2019, the European Commissioner for Budget and Human Resources Günther 
Oettinger expressed that the European Union should have the right to veto 
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Chinese investments in the infrastructure of EU member states, if they do not 
meet the common interests of the Union78. 
European officials adhere to the position that the EU must develop appropriate 
standards and rules in order to cooperate with China in the long term. The 
starting point may be to provide more opportunities for European investors in 
China. Thus, the partnership between EU companies and Chinese state-owned 
enterprises will help the latter to adopt high European social and environmental 
standards, which can be the basis for the long-awaited reforms in the Chinese 
public enterprises sector. Deeper EU involvement in the BRI will also reduce 
suspicion among Asian countries and the United States for China’s economic 
and political ambitions. Certain steps to reach an understanding between the EU 
and China in the investment field were taken at the 21st summit held in 2019. 
At its close, China and European Union expressed intention to sign a 
comprehensive bilateral investment agreement in 202079. Its essence is to 
significantly improve market access, eliminate discriminatory requirements and 
practices affecting foreign investors, and create a balanced investment 
protection system and inclusion of investment and sustainable development 
provisions. Also, as a result of China’s joining the EBRD in 2016 and the 
opening of its office in Beijing, the financial cooperation between China and 
Europe related to the project has expanded even more. An important step was 
the creation in 2018 of a joint EU-PRC investment fund with a capital of 500 
million euros. The contributors were the European Investment Fund and the Silk 
Road Fund80. 
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The problem in the social sphere is the poor awareness of the EU population 
about the project. Citizens still perceive Chinese investment with mixed 
feelings, as there are suspicions that China has broader strategic goals, unlimited 
only by economic cooperation. In addition, the EU media narrative continues to 
focus on the negative impact of Chinese deals on mergers and acquisitions in 
the economic situation in Europe, with almost no consideration of the socio-
political sphere and possible cooperation schemes for building long-term 
relations between the EU and China based on better understanding of mutual 
values and interests. 
 
3.3. “16 + 1” format as a platform for bilateral cooperation between the PRC 
and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) holds a special place in China’s strategy for 
implementing the Belt and Road. First, the region has a greater economic 
potential than the rest of Europe. According to the forecasts of the European 
Commission on the economic growth of the EU member states in 2019, the 
CEE countries’ economies will grow by an average of 3.3% per year, which is 
twice the average for the EU as a whole81. Secondly, this region is in dire need 
of building infrastructure. According to the PwC for 2017, to reduce the lag of 
the CEE countries from the rest of Europe in the field of infrastructure, the 
region needs to attract about 615 billion euros82. Thirdly, the CEE countries are 
the “gateway” to other developed European countries: the region lies between 
the Mediterranean end of the Maritime Silk Road route and the attractive 
European market. 
In 2012 a multilateral mechanism was launched at the initiative of China to 
develop and strengthen cooperation with 16 Central and Eastern European 
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countries, namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. The main format of interaction 
is the annual summits, which are held in one of the participating countries. 
Based on the results of each meeting, the parties prepare a joint document in 
which they set out their vision for the implementation of further cooperation, 
and also provide a brief report on the implementation of previously agreed 
cooperation projects. It is worth noting that from the position of the CEE 
countries, the initiative can be viewed as an extended version of the previous 
regional integration projects within the “16 + 1” format, which are weakly 
linked to the EU-China strategic partnership. In this regard, many previously 
agreed joint projects were included in the BRI after its announcement. 
For the first time the Chinese project was mentioned in a statement on the 
results of the 4th Summit in 2015, which took place after the publication of the 
first program document. Further at the fifth summit, held in Riga in 2016, a joint 
declaration was signed, in which the leaders of China and CEE agreed to further 
expand cooperation and exchanges in the framework of the BRI and “16 + 1” 
format. It emphasizes that the infrastructure and logistics projects for CEE are 
consistent with the principles developed within the framework of the EU-China 
interaction platform, which include an investment plan for Europe and projects 
for the construction of the Trans-European Transport Network83. 
The last summit was held in April 2019. The key event was the expansion of the 
number of participants through the inclusion of Greece. This indicates its 
special place in China’s strategy, which actively seeks to develop infrastructure 
projects in the country. At the summit the parties reported that over the past few 
years the export of CEE countries to China has increased almost six times, and 
bilateral cooperation is becoming closer. According to the data, in 2018 China 
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invested about 9 billion euros in 16 CEE countries, while the opposite figure is 
about 1.3 billion euros84. In November 2017 Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang 
announced that China would invest more than $ 3 billion in sustainable 
development projects in Central and Eastern European countries. In the same 
period, the Interbank Association of China and the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe was founded, which comprised financial institutions from 14 
countries, including China, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, 
etc. As one of the leading countries investing in the development of public 
transport and renewable energy, China also plays an important role in 
implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
Trade between China and the region has grown by 50% since the start of 
cooperation and reached 73.09 billion euros in 2018, which is 21% more than in 
201785. However, it is worth noting that compared with the total EU-China trade 
of 573 billion euros, this figure is rather modest - less than the figure of 100 
billion dollars, which was planned to be achieved by 2015. The trade balance is 
heavily shifted towards China, whose exports to the region grew much faster 
than imports. The geographical uneven distribution of trade flows was also 
observed: five countries out of 16 — Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovakia, and Romania — accounted for about 80% of all trade. At the same 
time, the EU remains the main trading partner of the Western Balkans - Croatia, 
Serbia, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(trade volume is 47.5 billion euros, accounting for 72.8% of total trade), while 
China ranks second with 3.7 billion euros (5.7%)86. 
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The lack of specific statements by China on implementation multilateral 
infrastructure projects within the “16 + 1” format is becoming criticized by 
European actors and experts87. First, the level of involvement of countries in the 
format is relatively uneven: there are 4 groups of countries, depending on the 
intensity of participation in the format. Only a few large countries, such as 
Poland, Serbia and Hungary, at the moment managed to extract the maximum 
benefit from Chinese investment. On the other hand, countries that relied on 
Chinese investment, especially in the area of infrastructure projects, were 
deprived of attention from investors. This led to competition among 16 
countries for the right to attract Chinese funding, but also to a more cautious 
approach to cooperation. So, Poland, which seeks to expand cooperation with 
China, at the same time remains cautious - earlier, countries once failed to 
implement a joint infrastructure project88. 
Secondly, there are obvious discrepancies between the participation of EU 
Member States and non-EU countries, especially in terms of investment and 
infrastructure. projects. Due to the regulatory framework, the Chinese credit line 
was used mainly by non-EU countries, for example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
for the construction of a thermal power plant, in Macedonia of motorways, in 
Serbia of a bridge over the Danube. In general, the level of Chinese investment 
in CEE countries is up to the current moment was low, and the construction of 
manufacturing bases announced by China in the region has yet to be realized. 
Thirdly, the most acute problem is the discrepancy between the initial 
overestimated expectations on the part of the CEE countries in the active 
development of the region and the real achievements of cooperation. Such 
unsatisfactory economic results in CEE countries are caused not only by the 
obvious asymmetry of the market size, but also by trade and investment 
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barriers: according to the European Commission’s database on market barriers, 
China ranks second in the number of different trade restrictions and barriers, 
second only to Russia89. Such results have caused frustration and skepticism, 
even among major CEE countries, such as Poland, which has the largest trade 
deficit with China. 
Fourthly, 11 out of 16 EU member states are taking part in the format, which 
causes reasonable concern among EU institutions and other member states. 
They are concerned that Beijing can use the “16 + 1” format as a tool to 
undermine relations between the CEE countries and the EU. Obviously, there is 
an economic aspect: for example, investment transactions concluded with China 
may go against the strategy and policies of the European Union. However, there 
is also a political aspect: for example, thanks to the objections of some member 
states, the EU’s statement on the situation in the South China Sea avoided direct 
accusations towards China90. Of the 16 CEE countries, China, Hungary and 
Greece are the most reluctant to criticize, as in recent years these countries have 
become the largest recipients of Chinese investment (the rejection of criticism 
from Slovenia and Croatia is mainly related to their own unresolved maritime 
disputes). To all among EU institutions, there is concern that China will 
continue to institutionalize “16 + 1” cooperation format. 
Fifth, there is an opinion inside the “16 + 1” that China pursues the goal of 
splitting the bloc of CEE countries, as it strengthens bilateral relations only with 
some of the 16 and pays more attention to them than others. For example, in 
2016, Xi Jinping visited the Czech Republic, the first CEE country ever visited 
by the Chinese leader. A high-ranking business delegation from China visited 
Romania in the same year, thanks to which the country received an investment 
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of 6 billion euros91. Serbia also seeks to demonstrate willingness to expand 
cooperation with China, and the format of cooperation is called “15 + 1 + 1” in 
the country itself. Indeed, from the point ща countries that have won the least 
the interaction can also be called 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 (etc.), which casts doubt on the 
nature of the format as a whole. The willingness of CEE countries to cooperate 
also depends on their different political identities. These differences depend on 
whether the countries are EU members and members of the Eurozone, which 
has a profound influence on the strategies of these countries and their desire to 
cooperate with China. For example, Serbia, which is not a EU member, is still 
more dependent on the support of its economic development from third 
countries and, therefore, is more willing to cooperate with China than the EU 
member states. 
Most actively China is implementing its cooperation with Poland, Hungary and 
Serbia, as evidenced by high trade volumes compared to other CEE countries. 
These three countries became one of the first countries to sign a memorandum 
with China on BRI92. As a result, projects related to the construction or 
modernization of railway lines, highways, ports or other infrastructure are 
rapidly developing, especially on the Balkan Peninsula. From all the states of 
the region Hungary, Poland and Serbia were mentioned the most (3, 5 and 2 
times, respectively) in a report published on April 22, 2019 on the progress and 
prospects of the initiative93. In addition, China's investments are also associated 
with the field of industry and services, including manufacturing, clean energy 
and tourism. While investments in new projects remain the main forms of 
China's activity in the region, in recent years the number of M&A deals, IPOs, 
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and joint construction projects has increased, which shows China’s desire to 
diversify its presence in Europe.  
Thus, China cooperated closely with Hungary to promote the 
internationalization of renminbi. In September 2013, the People's Bank of China 
entered into a 10 billion yuan currency swap agreement with Hungary94. In 
2014, the People's Bank of China opened its first branch in Hungary, the main 
task of which was to lend to local companies hoping to trade and invest in China 
(possibly in RMB). These actions have expanded Hungary’s cooperation with 
China, bringing financial relations to the institutional level. In addition, 
Hungary remains China’s key trading partner in the region; in 2018, total trade 
turnover amounted to $ 8.8 billion. Hungary became the first EU country to sign 
a memorandum of understanding with China to combine the BRI with 
Hungarian initiatives “Opening East” and “Opening South”. The flagship 
project is the high-speed railway between Belgrade and Budapest, which aims 
to become part of the routes connecting the Greek port of Piraeus with Central 
Europe. However, apart from this project, Hungary still has not attracted much 
attention from the Chinese companies in areas such as infrastructure, industry, 
and investment. Local companies are too small to participate in construction 
projects in third countries, and their awareness of the project is very limited. At 
the same time, Hungarian politicians are actively promoting Hungary as a 
tourist and cultural center of CEE, which led to the opening of the first office of 
the National Tourism Company of China in Budapest in March 2016 and the 
launch of China's Great Silk Road advertising campaign in 2017. 
Poland is another key partner with which China is implementing the 
construction of a railway connecting Sichuan Province and the Polish city of 
Lodz, as well as developing several Polish ports, such as Gdansk and Gdynia. 
Being one of the largest countries in CEE, Poland seeks closer cooperation with 
 
94 China signs currency swap agreement with Hungary, Chinadaily.com.cn, 2019, online, Internet, 6 
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China, as improving bilateral relations can enhance the country's status in the 
EU and around the world. These relations are primarily based on economic 
reasons: expanding exports, reducing the huge trade deficit and attracting 
investment. In this regard, Poland is most actively involved in the initiative, is a 
member of the AIIB (Poland is the sole founding member of the bank from 
Central and Eastern Europe) and is actively lobbying for Chinese interests 
within “16 + 1”95. The Polish government has repeatedly expressed its positive 
attitude towards the BRI. In addition to bilateral visits of the heads of state in 
2015-16, the former Polish Foreign Minister Vitold Washchikovsky in his 
speeches referred to the initiative as an opportunity for Poland’s development96. 
Although relations between countries are developing quite rapidly, experts 
identify several problems in the implementation of the Way project. One of 
them is American influence in Poland and the activities of the internal pro-
Western opposition. This approach can be described as Poland’s double policy 
towards China. This means that Polish the government, on the one hand, seeks 
to actively develop cooperation with China, but at the same time does not want 
to worsen relations with the United States. On top of that, authorities are 
confronted with anti-Chinese rhetoric emanating from internal opposition. As a 
result of Poland’s attempts to maintain a balance in relations with major powers, 
its policy is sometimes contradictory. The second negative factor is the huge 
negative trade balance on the Polish side. So, in 2018, China of all the Polish 
trading partners became the country with the largest trade deficit. Foreign trade 
turnover amounted to 20 billion euros, of whose 17.9 billion euros imports from 
China. It is worth noting the problems with Polish exports to China, including 
the Chinese ban on Polish pork, problems with obtaining export certificates for 
 
95 Xavier Richet. The 16+1 Format: Chinese presence in fragmented markets on the periphery of 
Europe, China-CEE Institute, 2019, online, Internet, 6 Aug. 2019. Available: https://china-cee.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/Xavier-Richet.pdf.  
96 ‘Belt and Road' a promising platform for China-Europe cooperation - China.org.cn, China.org.cn, 
2019, online, Internet, 6 Aug. 2019. Available: http://www.china.org.cn/world/2016-
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food or agricultural products (for example, apples), as well as the export 
structure, which is not beneficial for Poland. The third negative factor is the 
difference in strategic priorities. Despite the fact that China is extremely 
important for Poland, it is still not the center of Polish foreign policy. Instead, 
Poland pays more attention to the situation in the region and solving problems 
with its Eastern partners and the countries of the Visegrád Group. Speaking 
about technical problems, experts from the Eurasian Development Bank note 
the insufficient processing capacity of the checkpoints on the Belarusian-Polish 
border. In this case, the most intensive container train traffic is the crossing 
border Brest (Belarus) - Malaszewicze (Poland). Almost all the routes 
connecting China and the EU pass through it. For the nine months of 2017 the 
number of container trains that transit through the Belarusian Railway from 
China to Europe, amounted to 1109, and from Europe to China - 75997. Given 
the current state of infrastructure, locomotive and wagon fleets in Poland, a 
significant increase in container traffic through the Brest - Malaszewicze 
crossing is seen doubtful. Already now, the Polish side accepts only 9-10 
instead of the agreed 14 formulations per day. Infrastructure restrictions in 
Poland lead to the fact that at the border crossing Brest - Malaszewicze idles up 
to 3.5 thousand cars. This border crossing is also a major concern for large 
shippers such as Hewlett-Packard (HP). According to HP, the company’s trains 
on the Chongqing – Duisburg route have been idle for two to three days. At the 
same time, trains coming from other Chinese cities can stand idle on the route 
for five to six days98.  
Serbia has long been one of China's leading partners in Europe. According to Li 
Manchan, Chinese Ambassador to Serbia, due to the large number of 
agreements and projects between  China and Serbia in recent years, this format 
 
97 Транспортные коридоры Шелкового пути: анализ барьеров и рекомендации по направлению 
инвестиций, ЦИИ ЕАБР, 2019, online, Internet, 6 Aug. 2019. Available: 
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can be called 1 "5 + 1 + 1"99. During Xi Jinping’s visit to Serbia in June 2016, 
both countries described bilateral relations as a comprehensive strategic 
partnership. The introduction of a bilateral visa-free entry regime for visits 
lasting up to one month, which was signed in a package with other bilateral 
agreements during the fifth China-CEE summit in Riga 2016, also shows close 
ties between the two countries. Due to the tragic bombing the Chinese Embassy 
in Belgrade in 1999, Serbia and China further strengthened their relations. 
Secondly, an important aspect of these relations is also the constant respect of 
each other’s basic interests. Serbia supports China on human rights issues, the 
situation in the South China Sea, cooperation in building a market economy. 
Serbia’s position is especially valuable to Beijing in light of the disagreement of 
some EU member states with China over these issues. Serbia also supports 
China on issues related to Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet. In turn, China favors 
Serbia’s diplomatic struggle over Kosovo’s sovereignty. In response to changes 
in the 21st century and the emergence of China as the future economic leader in 
the world, in 200 ,Serbia outlined the development of strategic relations with 
China as one of the main goals of its diplomacy. The global financial crisis laid 
the foundation for further deepening Sino-Serbian relations, as Serbia faced 
with the problems of finding alternative ways to develop the economy. Serbia 
occupies a geographically important position between the EU, Southeast Europe 
and Asia, which makes it a key logistics hub for air, rail, road and water 
transportation. Thus, Serbia is a potentially valuable link in the Chinese 
initiative. In the future, China will be able to benefit from this advantageous 
geographical position, implementing a number of projects. They include the 
development of transport networks that will not only connect Serbia with 
various logistics and commercial centers in Central and Southeast Europe, but 
will also enhance transport and trade flows between West Asia and North 
 
99 Ли Манчанг: Највише споразума са Србијом, други љубоморни, Politika Online, 2019, online, 
Internet, 7 Aug. 2019. Available: http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/367192/Li-Mancang-Najvise-
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Africa. Chinese investors expect great opportunities to expand their presence in 
infrastructure, energy, agriculture, communications technology and tourism. 
This is primarily due to the lack of finance and experience in developing these 
sectors within Serbia, while the country is committed to the active 
implementation of development projects. Zhu Lianqi, Economic Advisor at the 
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, noted that the total cost of four joint 
infrastructure projects in Serbia is already higher than in any other CEE country. 
Nevertheless, the Chinese investors’ activities in Serbia are fraught with a 
number of objective problems. Serbia’s internal laws and standards are still not 
perfect and often not as strict and clear as within the EU. In this situation, in 
order to minimize investment risks, China needs to strengthen market research. 
There is also the problem of the negative image of China among Serbian 
citizens who do not approve of the Chinese development model, which, in their 
opinion, leads their country to colonial dependence on Beijing. The volume and 
structure of bilateral trade also remain unsatisfactory: in 2017, it amounted to $ 
550 million, of which China's export amounted to $ 420 million. 
For the next stage of the implementation of the BRI in CEE countries, China 
needs to move from government declarations to concrete cooperation with all 
format participants. In implementing the project, China also needs to recognize 
the priority role of the EU in relation to CEE countries, which will dispel 
existing concerns and improve relations China with countries in the region. In 
particular, in order to reduce EU suspicion, China should focus on the 
implementation of the 2020 EU-China Strategic Cooperation Program. China 
and CEE countries are currently developing a medium-term cooperation plan, 
which is believed to bring the interaction of China and CEE to a new, deeper 
and more strategic level. In turn, this step may cause even more concern on the 
part of the EU. 
China should continue to establish cooperation with 16 CEE countries in non-
economic areas to ensure balanced cooperation. For example, cooperation with 
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small and medium-sized CEE countries in the field of jurisprudence, culture, 
education and science can not only attract these countries to a more active 
participation in the project, but also improve its image. This can be achieved 
through the creation of a special fund for financing cultural and educational 
exchanges. Everything else holding special conferences, grants for research 
projects in the implementation of the BRI will help improve public 
understanding of Chinese culture and values, eliminate prejudice in society and 
strengthen the cultural soft power of China. 
Joint think tanks also play an important role in informal relations between China 
and the EU. It is noted that in recent years, China and CEE countries have 
intensified the activities of such centers: since 2012, the Chinese government 
has allocated about two million yuan a year for the “China-Central and Eastern 
Europe Relations Research Fund”, which supports academic exchanges and 
cooperation with both sides. However, it cannot be denied that the academic 
exchange between China and the CEE countries began late, and the quality, 
scale and influence are still far from satisfactory. 
 
3.4. Bilateral cooperation between the PRC and the countries of Western and 
Southern Europe within the OBOR 
There is hardly any European country in which the Chinese initiative would not 
cause controversy in power circles about the true motives, implementation and 
problems as well as potential opportunities for EU member states and European 
business. In theory, Western Europe, which is symbolically regarded as the final 
destination of the BRI and represents the most important market for Chinese 
goods, should have occupied a major place in the project. However, China’s 
comprehensive approach to this project does not mean that all EU member 
states are equally important to it. Within Europe, the main projects under the 
auspices of the OBOR are actually concentrated in two specific regions: Central 
and Eastern Europe and the countries of the European Mediterranean. In fact, 
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the EU countries have quite different opinions about the project. A December 
2016 survey of cooperation with China by the European think-tank network on 
China showed that most Western European governments seem to be “neutral” to 
it, and some believe that the BRI is not important enough for their country100. 
Their participation in the BEP is still limited to membership in the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank, which formally is not part of the project, but is 
in fact closely related to its implementation. At the same time, some local or 
regional authorities, such as the city authorities of Duisburg, Hamburg and 
Lyon, welcome the initiative as they see a concrete potential benefit in attracting 
Chinese investment. Various European companies have also responded 
positively to the new opportunities offered in the field of container terminal 
construction, railway construction and the provision of logistics services. This 
applies, for example, to logistics firms in countries such as Poland, Germany 
and the Netherlands that have direct rail links with China. On the other hand, in 
some cases, the OBOR-related projects encountered political obstacles. For 
example, in Greece, the privatization process, which ultimately led to the 
acquisition by COSCO of a controlling stake in the port of Piraeus, was stopped 
for more than one year after the left-wing party SYRIZA won the national 
elections in Greece in early 2015101. 
The privatization processes taking place in the public transport sector in some 
countries of Southern Europe, in turn, open up opportunities for Chinese firms 
to acquire and invest. COSCO, the largest cargo company in China, and other 
Chinese shipping companies invest in the ports of Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Croatia, Slovenia, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Latvia and Lithuania. It is 
characteristic that these projects were implemented before the announcement of 
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the initiative and only then were included in it. With the adoption of the “Going 
Out” policy, China began to actively penetrate European investment markets. 
Since then, there has been an increase in the number of state enterprises, as well 
as some private companies investing in the EU. Examples include the Geely-
Volvo partnership in Sweden, Zoomlion-Cifa in Italy, Sany-Putzmeister in 
Germany, Dongfeng Motor-PSA Peugeot Citroen in France. China has also 
expanded its presence in Eastern and Central Europe by purchasing shares in the 
Albanian airport of Tirana and the Slovenian airport of Ljubljana. In 2013, the 
Beijing Construction Engineering Group (BCEG) launched a major £ 800 
million project to reconstruct Manchester Airport, the UK’s second largest 
airport. Thanks to the successful completion of this project, in 2018 BCEG and 
the Manchester airport group (MAG) announced that they will jointly 
participate in the reconstruction of Sofia Airport in Bulgaria102. In some cases, 
Chinese companies provide logistics services to third parties that are not directly 
connected with the EU. For example, COSCO Logistics, a subsidiary of 
COSCO, designed and carried out the transportation of HP components from 
Foxconn's Chongqing, Central China, overland to Guangdong. From there, they 
were transported by sea to Piraeus, and then by train to assembly plants in the 
Czech Republic, which also belong to Foxconn. HP's finished products are then 
sold throughout Europe. Another subsidiary of COSCO Shipping ports acted as 
an important link in the transportation of assembly components, as it was she 
who was responsible for through warehousing and further shipment of products 
from the Greek port103. 
A number of BRI-related projects initiated by Europe are also often not 
officially correlated with the Chinese initiative, despite the fact that they are 
 
102 BCEG in partnership with MAG for participation in the Sofia Airport concession process, BCEGI, 
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aimed at strengthening interconnectedness with Beijing. Thus, the Five Ports 
Alliance, a large container terminal project developed by The North Adriatic 
Ports Association with the participation of ports in Italy (Venice, Trieste and 
Ravenna), Slovenia (Koper) and Croatia (Rijeka), seems to be a regional 
response to OBOR104. The project aims to create a docking and unloading 
system through the construction of a giant offshore platform in the port city of 
Malamocco near Venice, which would allow huge Chinese cargo ships passing 
through the Suez Canal to unload goods and send them by rail through Germany 
and Switzerland to Central and North European markets. This project aroused 
great interest from Italy and China and is funded by the Italian government and 
the means of the BRI by the Chinese government and Chinese state enterprises. 
China's interests are more limited in the northern EU countries. There is 
practically no diplomatic dialogue about the initiative, and little reference to it 
in the public. Southern Europe is uniquely located at the crossroads of Chinese 
geopolitical, commercial and investment interests. The Chinese government 
took an active stance on the Mediterranean countries following the launch of the 
initiative. As mentioned earlier, the interests and actual participation in the 
initiative not only vary greatly between EU members, but also vary within each 
country between different municipalities and regions based on their own logistic 
and business ties with China. China’s greatest activity in Western and Southern 
Europe observed in 7 countries. The remaining states practically did not take 
part in the project. 
 
3.4.1. Germany 
Among the Western European countries of the EU, China has achieved the 
greatest progress in bilateral relations with Germany. Germany's trade turnover 
with China in 2018 increased by 6.7% percent, amounting to $ 188.9 billion, 
 
104 Zhang, Hu. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and the Leading Function of the Shipping 
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compared with $ 177.2 billion in 2017. In 2018, China remained Germany's 
largest trading partner for 3 consecutive years, and relations between the two 
countries are becoming closer105. In this regard, Germany is considered as a key 
European participant in the Belt and Road. Between China and Germany signed 
agreements on cooperation in finance, energy, industry and agriculture, as well 
as education. Five German-Chinese railway routes (Leipzig-Shenyang, 
Duisburg-Chongqing, Hamburg-Zhengzhou, Hamburg-Harbin and Nuremberg-
Chengdu) have already been put into operation. The railway connection 
between Duisburg and Chongqing received much attention and active 
promotion from the two countries’ municipalities106. Investment cooperation 
between the countries is actively developing: about 30% of German companies 
operating in China participate or are considering participating in the project. At 
the same time, only a third of all German companies in China are confident that 
their investment in this project will have a positive impact on their business. 
The majority of German investment in OBOR is in the automotive and 
construction sectors, accounting for almost 40 percent of the total investment. 
The rest are in sectors such as logistics, energy, business, finance and 
transportation. 46% of German companies do so as subcontractors or suppliers 
for Chinese companies. A large number of German companies are located in 
Taizang, in Jiangsu province in eastern China. The region is known for its 
access to the Yangtze River Delta and its large population. Since August 2016, 
Taicang has attracted more than 250 small and medium German companies, 
which generated revenue of 18.6 billion yuan ($ 2.72 billion). German 
companies are planning further investments in Jiangsu, Guangdong, Sichuan 
and Chongqing. Major Chinese cities such as Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou 
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and Shenzhen, also remain popular destinations for German investment. There 
are three joint German-Chinese industrial parks in China. Despite the fact that at 
the official level they were not assigned to the project, they play an important 
role in cooperation between large as well as small and medium enterprises that 
seek to expand their business activity within the project. The parks are located 
in the following cities107: 
● The Sino-German (Shenyang) Intelligent Equipment Manufacturing Park, 
important center for advanced engineering; among the partners of the 
park are such world giants as BMW, Siemens and BASF. 
● The Kunshan German Industrial Park, focuses on the development of 
European and American small and medium enterprises, which offer 
experience in the field of highly efficient production, science and 
technology, environmental protection. Leading industries are mechanical 
engineering, high-quality food and logistics. 
● The Sino-German Small and Medium Enterprises Cooperation. By 2020, 
the park plans to attract more than 100 German enterprises, which is 
projected to bring 10 billion yuan. In addition to well-developed 
infrastructure, the population of the region provides the workforce 
necessary for enterprises based here. Vocational training of local Chinese 
students in German standards makes the park very attractive for German 
investors. 
 
However, the problem of the trade deficit between countries, which amounts to 
about $ 20 billion, is still obvious. In addition, trains carrying goods from China 
are usually fully loaded with electronics and other goods, and trains to China 
often have problems finding sufficient to send the volume of production. A 
number of steps have been taken to improve the efficiency of this rail transport, 
but technical details such as cooling systems and temperature fluctuations 
 
107 Ibid. 
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during transportation still remain unresolved. Until now, with the exception of 
railway projects, new investments in infrastructure and projects in Germany 
have not been implemented and major mergers and acquisitions have not been 
completed under the BRI. This is due to suspicion on the part of the German 
government of the true goals of China. So, a debate broke out in 2016 on 
Chinese deals for the acquisition of technology brands in areas important to 
national security. As a result, the Chinese company was prohibited from 
acquiring the semiconductor company Aixtron108. In this situation, Germany is 
actively promoting the development of cooperation using the EU-China 
interaction platform. Germany owns 4.1% vote in the Council of AIIB (the 
largest figure among EU countries, together holding 20.3% vote). 
 
3.4.2. France 
Unlike Germany, France received much less attention from the Chinese 
government. The volume of trade in 2018 amounted to $ 55.95 billion (export - 
$ 23.23 billion, import - $ 32.72), and Chinese projects under the BRI are 
almost invisible. In France China’s strategy consists mainly of discussing 
potential economic opportunities at the annual Paris Forum on the New Silk 
Road, which became operational in November 2017. Representatives of the 
largest French and Chinese companies, diplomatic representatives of both 
countries, as well as members of governments participate in it. Based on the 
results of the last forum in 2018, a number of projects for joint investments were 
agreed109, however, the start date for their implementation remains unclear. The 
French government lacks a clear position on this topic, which in practice leads 
to an inconsistent policy. So, during the visit of the Chinese Leader for France 
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in the spring of 2019, Emmanuel Macron invited German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker to a 
meeting110. This can be seen as an attempt to put pressure on China, which 
shortly before the meeting concluded a package of agreements under the project 
with Italy. 
On the other hand, in recent years, many French regions and municipalities have 
taken active steps to promote their local advantages in order to attract Chinese 
investors. Lyon, playing the role of a historical, commercial and political center 
in Europe, is looking for opportunities to attract Chinese investment and wide 
access to the Chinese market. So, the Chongqing Duisburg Express was 
extended to Lyon in April 2016. The Normandy region is also trying to interest 
Chinese investors in its deep-water port of Le Havre and its connections with 
the inland ports of Rouen and Paris. For 2019, 102 pairs of Chinese and French 
cities and regions established twinning relationships. Spheres such as transport, 
telecommunications, tourism and pharmaceuticals are open for investment. In 
connection with the China’s proposal to create a Union of twin cities within the 
BRI, France can significantly expand its participation in the project. Cultural 
and educational exchanges are actively developing: in 2018, about 40 thousand 
Chinese students studied in France, more than 100 thousand French 
schoolchildren and students studied Chinese, and the number of tourists from 
China who visited France reached a historic record level111.  
However, ongoing projects are implemented outside the BRI. The only 
symbolic step was the Silk Road Partnership Agreement, signed in June 2015 
between the French shipping company CMA CGM and China Merchants 
Holdings International. CMA CGM received a $ 1 billion credit line from 
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China's Export-Import Bank for the purchase of Chinese container ships112. In 
2019, the French-associated state of Monaco will become the first foreign 
testing zone for the deployment of 5G networks by the Chinese 
telecommunications giant Huawei113. However, this is considered by Western 
countries (in particular the USA) as China’s attempt to set up surveillance on 
European countries. 
 
3.4.3. Britain 
Although Brexit’s influence is still not well defined, the UK’s participation as a 
major European country in the project remains confirmed. The geographical 
boundaries of the initiative did not prevent the UK government and business 
from actively responding to it. A good demonstration of this desire is that Great 
Britain became the first European country to join the AIIB in March 2015. This 
can be seen as a political message in support of the Beijing-led organization, 
which the UK considers useful for the long-term economic development of Asia 
and Europe. By the year 2018 China remains the country's third largest importer 
with a volume of $ 59.52 billion, but Britain's exports ($ 26.02 billion) are 
almost 2 times less than imports, indicating a significant trade deficit. 
The main logic underlying the desire to participate in the project is the 
opportunities that it can provide to British companies and the financial sector 
services. This became especially urgent during the Brexit, the influence of 
which can negatively affect the country's trade and investment sphere in the 
future. In 2015 The Sino-British Business Council issued a report entitled “One 
Belt, One Road”, which identified key opportunities in several sectors of the 
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economy114. In 2016, the council, in cooperation with Tsinghua University, 
prepared another report on the cooperation of British and Chinese companies in 
the field of design, construction and consulting115. Great Britain’s such an active 
attitude indicates the primacy that it gives to economic and commercial 
diplomacy, as well as its pragmatic response to the growing influence of China 
in world affairs. In October 2015, President Xi Jinping visited the United 
Kingdom and mentioned the “golden era” of relations between the two 
countries116. During the visit both countries not only reiterated their desire to 
strengthen financial cooperation, but also agreed on China's investment in the 
construction of a Hinkley Point nuclear power plant in western Britain, as well 
as the installation of the Hualong One Chinese nuclear reactor near Bradville, in 
eastern Britain. The 12,000 km Yiwu-London railway route was commissioned 
in 2017, making London the 15th European city connected by rail to China. 
 
3.4.4. Italy 
As of 2019, the country has the lowest economic growth rates in the last 10 
years. According to the report of the European Commission on the economic 
growth of the EU member states in 2019, Italy takes the last place with a rate of 
0.2%117. Due to insufficient EU attention to the country's problems, Italy is 
forced to look for alternative incentives for the development of its economy. 
Such a stimulus could be the Chinese project. Since 2013, trade between 
countries has increased from $ 32.87 billion to $ 49.03 billion in 2018. Italy is 
interested in closer cooperation with China, and therefore, despite 
 
114 One Belt One Road // China-Britain business council, Cbbc.org, 2019, online, Internet, 17 Aug. 
2019. Available: http://www.cbbc.org/resources/one-belt-one-road/.  
115 China-Britain belt and road case studies report: global partnerships in action // China Britain 
business council, Cbbc.org, 2019, online, Internet, 17 Aug. 2019. Available: 
http://www.cbbc.org/cbbc/media/cbbc_media/4.%20Files/China-Britain-Belt-and-Road-Case-Studies-
Report.pdf.  
116 Xi Jinping visit: UK-China ties 'will be lifted to new height, BBC News, 2019, online, Internet, 17 
Aug. 2019. Available: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34571436.  
117 European Economic Forecast 2019, Ec.europa.eu, 2019, online, Internet, 26 Aug. 2019.  
Available: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/ip102_en.pdf.  
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disagreements between the left-wing party Five Stars and the far-right League it 
became the first G-7 country in 2019 to sign a memorandum of understanding 
on the implementation of the BRI. Italy also ignored Washington, Brussels, 
Berlin and Paris’s clear discontent. The memorandum of understanding between 
Italy and China includes 29 separate sections on cooperation in the banking 
sector, construction and development of ports, and export of agricultural 
products, media, science and technology, and even the return of China's cultural 
artifacts that are stored in Italy118. 
Among other signed agreements, two port infrastructure development deals 
between China Communications Construction and Trieste, as well as the largest 
the port of Italy is Genoa are notable. Officially, the amount of transactions is 
not reported, but according to the Reuters news agency, the cost can reach 20 
billion euros. While Genoa is less in need of, Trieste has the greatest potential 
for Chinese investment. The port is strategically important for China, as it 
provides a link between the Mediterranean and landlocked countries such as 
Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Serbia. Although the parties 
did not give any details on the development and management of the ports, 
European countries have openly criticized Chinese investment activity in the 
region because of concerns that they might be used to deploy naval forces. 
Chinese warships have already entered to the port of Piraeus, the largest seaport 
in Greece, a controlling stake in which belongs to the Chinese company Cosco 
Shipping. 
French President Emmanuel Macron stated that EU has made a strategic 
mistake by allowing Chinese companies to acquire shares in European ports119. 
Due to pressure from the USA and other EU countries, Italy crossed out a 
 
118 Италия поддержала инициативу Китая «Один пояс — один путь», ЭКД, 2019, online, Internet, 
26 Aug. 2019. Available: http://ekd.me/2019/03/italiya-podderzhala-iniciativu-kitaya-odin-poyas-odin-
put/.  
119 Italy joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative highlights different approaches of Europe and the US 
on Asia policy, South China Morning Post, 2019, online, Internet, 26 Aug. 2019. Available: 
https://amp.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/3004114/italy-joining-chinas-belt-and-road-
initiative-highlights.  
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number of agreements from the original draft memorandum. The agreements on 
data exchange, development of 5G telecommunication networks and strategic 
infrastructure were excluded. The United States continues to put pressure on 
European countries in its desire to prevent the development of 5G technology 
from Huawei in Western countries. Another move that caught the attention of 
some Italian political and business leaders was the takeover of the Italian tire 
manufacturer Pirelli by China National Chemical and the Silk Road Fund in 
2015120. 
 
3.4.5. Portugal 
Due to its strategic position, Portugal occupies a special place in China's 
strategy for the implementation of the Maritime Silk Road. Despite the fact that 
the trade volume between the countries is rather small ($ 3.24 billion), China is 
constantly increasing investment cooperation. In the framework of the “Go 
Global” policy, China began to actively penetrate Portuguese market. In 
particular, in 2011 the Chinese state corporation Three Gorges bought back a 
2.7% stake in the largest country's energy company Energias de Portugal (EdP). 
In June 2014, EdP CEO Joao Marquez Cruz said that thanks to this deal, his 
company is interested in collaborating with CTG in the Brazilian or African 
market. Three months later China's state-owned electricity grid invested 1.4 
billion euros in a 25% stake in Redes Energéticas Nacionais (REN), the national 
electricity grid operator, and Huawei invested 10 million euros in technology 
center in Portugal. For the private sector, based in Shanghai private 
conglomerate Fosun International spent € 1 billion in 2014 to acquire 80% of 
Caixa Seguros Saúde, Portugal's largest insurance company, and acquired 
Espírito Santo Financial Group hospital business for 460.5 million euros. In 
2016, the Chinese delegation from the port city of Ningbo Zhoushan, which is 
 
120 ChemChina to buy into Italian tire maker Pirelli in $7.7 billion deal, Reuters, 2019, online, Internet, 
26 Aug. 2019. Available: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pirelli-chemchina-
idUSKBN0MI0PQ20150323.  
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the fifth largest in the world in terms of congestion, visited the port of Sinus in 
search of investment opportunities, however, no specific statements were made 
as a result of this visit121. 
In 2018, the PRC leader successfully convinced the country to join the BRI The 
agreements signed in Lisbon include the construction of a new container 
terminal in the deepwater port of Sines in southern Portugal122. Many words 
were also spoken about similar deals in the port of Praia de Vitoria, which is 
located on the strategic Azores, near the military air base Laztech, where the 
planes of the United States and Portugal are located. Chinese investors are 
actively participating in the Portuguese government’s privatization policy. 
Moreover, these investments are strategic, because Portugal can help China 
enter the markets of Africa and Latin America due to its ties with the former 
colonies. 
 
3.4.6. Spain 
China is Spain’s third largest importer ($ 25.24 billion), but exports are 
relatively small at $ 6.9 billion. The main part of cooperation is carried out in 
the field of maritime infrastructure: in 2017 the Chinese company COSCO 
Shipping acquired a 51 percent stake in the large Spanish marine terminal 
Noatum Ports located in Valencia. This is one of the busiest seaports in Europe, 
which accounts for a significant portion of the country's GDP. Sun Kai, CEO of 
Noatum Ports, said the port’s strategic geographical location, production 
facilities, and modern operating systems make it a key link from Asia to 
Europe123. In the same year, a memorandum of understanding was also signed 
 
121 Rethinking the Silk road: China’s Belt and Road initiative and Emerging Eurasian relations / Edited 
by Maximilian Mayer. – Tongji: Tongji University, 2018. – P. 169. 
122 Portugal: the latest to be seduced by China’s Belt and Road, European-views.com, 2019, online, 
Internet, 26 Aug. 2019. Available: https://www.european-views.com/2018/12/portugal-the-latest-to-be-
seduced-by-chinas-belt-and-road/.  
123 Noatum Ports to boost China-Spain maritime cooperation, News.cgtn.com, 2019, online, Internet, 
26 Aug. 2019. Available: 
https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d414f34516a4e79457a6333566d54/share_p.html.  
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between the Instituto de Credito Oficial and the Bank of China, and another one 
between the port of Algeciras in Spain and the Chinese Ningbo Zhoushan Port 
Group. COSCO Shipping also operates the port of Bilbao, the gateway to 
Europe for ships crossing the North Atlantic. Everything else, Madrid is the 
final destination of the longest railway in the world (13 thousand km.) Iu-
Madrid. However, at the official level, the Government of Spain made it clear 
that it is not yet considering participation in Chinese initiative. The refusal of 
Spain is explained by the fact that it will seek to develop its interconnectedness 
with Asia in the framework of the EU programs. 
 
3.4.7. Netherlands 
The Netherlands is one of China's largest trading partners in the EU. The trade 
volume in 2018 amounted to $ 107.82 billion (import - $ 95.26 billion, export - 
$ 12, 45 billion respectively). Imports from China make up 1/3 of all goods 
arriving at the port of Rotterdam, which is the key point of all trade flows in the 
country. Thanks to the opening of new direct air routes between Schiphol and 
China, it was possible to increase the growth in air traffic between the 
Netherlands and several Chinese cities. However, during his first visit to the 
Netherlands in March 2014, the head of the People’s Republic of China never 
mentioned the OPOP, while on a visit to Germany the same year, he called for 
Sino-German cooperation to expand the Silk Road. Nevertheless, some 
companies are actively promoting projects related to the BRI. These include the 
acquisition by China COSCO Shipping of a 35% stake in the Euromax terminal 
in Rotterdam in May 2016124, as well as the opening in April 2016 of a new 
route between Chengdu and Tilburg, which was further extended to Rotterdam 
in September 2016. Trains from Chengdu carry Sony, Samsung and Fuji 
consumer electronics, while trains from Tilburg transport goods for oil industry, 
 
124 COSCO Pacific Ltd acquires 35% stake in Euromax Terminal, Chinadaily.com.cn, 2019, online, 
Internet, 26 Aug. 2019. Available: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-
05/12/content_25231794.htm.  
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cars, wine and wood. In July 2016, three Dutch transport companies established 
a joint venture New Silkway Logistics (NSWL), providing services for the 
transport of goods by rail Duisburg-Chongqing. 
In the rest of Europe, China’s activity on the BRI is almost invisible. This once 
again testifies to the election strategy of the Chinese government in the 
implementation of its large-scale project, despite statements from Beijing on a 
comprehensive approach. 
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CONCLUSION 
The thesis attempted to answer the question “What is behind the OBOR 
Initiative?”  
In the first chapter, a look was taken at the theoretical lens and the realist IR 
school of thought was chosen as the adequate theory due to it helps to answer 
research questions regarding Chine’s behaviour.  
The second chapter analyzes the characteristics of the Belt and Road. The first 
sub-chapter is devoted to the study of the key stages in the establishment and 
development of the BRI. The second sub-chapter analyzes the strategic motives 
for the implementation of the initiative. The third sub-chapter is devoted to the 
main problems of the project. 
The third chapter covers the cooperation practices between China and Europe 
within the BRI. The first sub-chapter reviews the dynamics of political, trade 
and economic relations between the EU and China until 2013. The second sub-
chapter discusses the specifics of interaction within the initiative at the EU-PRC 
level. The third sub-chapter is devoted to the analysis of cooperation between 
China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the “16 + 1” format. 
The fourth sub-chapter examines the bilateral interaction between China and the 
countries of Western and Southern Europe in the framework of the OBOR. 
 
Following the collapse of the bipolar system China for 30 years has transformed 
from a developing economy into a leading industrial power, which is rightfully 
considered the second economy in the world. China’s increased needs and 
capabilities demanded the development of new geo-economic strategies, which 
was reflected in the emergence of the Belt and Road project. Nominated by 
President Xi Jinping in 2013, today the OBOR sets the main vector for the 
development of China's foreign policy. During the study the main motives for 
the establishment of the project were identified, most of which are associated 
with the economic development of country’s western provinces, in particular 
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Xinjiang, as well as with specific threats to economic security from the United 
States. Based on Chinese capital, the project covers almost all areas of 
economic cooperation and contributes to the transformation of Chinese 
investment potential into one of the largest in the world. The opportunity to 
receive Chinese investments and the willingness of the PRC to provide them as 
part of joint projects makes the BRI attractive for many countries, both 
developed and developing, which are more acute in their lack of capital. The 
main investment flow falls on the infrastructure development, since, according 
to the Chinese authorities, it is the "framework" of the entire project. China has 
created a number of financial institutions in order to implement projects in the 
BRI countries, including the Silk Road Fund with a total capital of $ 80 billion, 
as well as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with a registered capital of 
$ 100 billion. In 2013–2018 China's direct investment and contract work in 
countries along the Belt and Road exceeded $ 90 billion and $ 400 billion 
respectively125.  
Despite China’s optimistic attitude towards the implementation of the BRI, 
there are specific problems of a political and economic nature that slow down 
cooperation processes. At the same time, India, Japan and the United States see 
the project as a threat to their regional interests and seek to prevent expansion of 
Chinese influence. 
Europe continues to be a key area of cooperation within the BRI. In 2016, the 
volume of Chinese foreign direct investment in the EU reached its historic 
maximum, amounting to 37.2 billion euros126. The main sectors for Chinese FDI 
are transport and information technology. However, China’s growing presence 
in European markets is a matter of concern to member governments as well as 
EU institutions. This is primarily due to incomplete understanding of the 
 
125 The Belt and Road Initiative Progress, Contributions and Prospects, Yidaiyilu.gov.cn, 2019, online, 
Internet, 27 Aug. 2019. Available: https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/86739.htm.  
126 Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 trends and impact of new screening policies, Rhodium group, 2019, 
online, Internet, 27 Aug. 2019. Available: https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2019-
03/190311_MERICS-Rhodium%20Group_COFDI-Update_2019.pdf.  
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Chinese strategy for the implementation of the project and the true motives for 
its appearance. In practice, this has led to a tightening of national legislation in 
the field of foreign investment. In 2017-2018 some European countries have 
tightened control over foreign mergers and acquisitions, especially in areas 
directly related to national security. Certain transactions between Chinese and 
European companies that would provide investors from China with access to 
technology, confidential information or strategically important infrastructure 
were suspended or canceled. These steps led to a reduction in Chinese 
investment in 2017-18 for 40% compared to 2016. In March 2019, the EU 
launched a new system to monitor foreign investment at a pan-European level, 
which is likely to lead to further review of legislation within member countries 
and will strengthen coordination between the European Commission and 
national governments in the field of FDI regulation127. Despite the decline in 
FDI, China continues to actively increase cooperation with Europe. 
Collaboration on the OPOR project is carried out at three levels: in the format of 
EU-PRC summits, in the framework of bilateral cooperation with individual 
European countries that are of most interest to China, as well as through the 
CEE 16 + 1 mechanism. An analysis of the dynamics of cooperation at all three 
levels showed that China's greatest activity in the implementation of the BRI is 
manifested in the framework of cooperation with individual European countries, 
while the multilateral formats are used by the PRC as a platform for promoting 
bilateral initiatives. It is expected that a negative reaction from the EU and those 
countries of Europe that are less involved in the project will force China to 
reconsider its approach to cooperation. 
In conclusion, evidences in the research suggest that the realist perspective is 
more coherent in assessing China’s motivations behind the OBOR initiative. 
 
127 REGULATION (EU) 2019/452 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 19 
March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union, 
Eur-lex.europa.eu, 2019, online, Internet, 27 Aug. 2019. Available: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019R0452&from=EN.  
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Political and economic evidences suggest that the OBOR initiative aims to bring 
European countries under China’s sphere of influence initially by mutual 
growth and win-win cooperation, then creating market dependencies as well as 
establishing Chinese overseas bases along the economic routes, and newly 
conceived financial institutions aim to challenge the international order.  
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